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Abstract
We consider the problem of gambling on a quantum experiment and enforce
rational behaviour by a few rules. These rules yield, in the classical case,
the Bayesian theory of probability via duality theorems. In our quantum
setting, they yield the Bayesian theory generalised to the space of Hermi-
tian matrices. This very theory is quantum mechanics: in fact, we derive
all its four postulates from the generalised Bayesian theory. This implies
that quantum mechanics is self-consistent. It also leads us to reinterpret
the main operations in quantum mechanics as probability rules: Bayes’
rule (measurement), marginalisation (partial tracing), independence (ten-
sor product). To say it with a slogan, we obtain that quantum mechanics
is the Bayesian theory in the complex numbers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics (QM) is based on four main axioms – or postulates. These axioms
were derived after a long process of trial and error, which involved a considerable amount
of guessing by the originators of the theory. The motivation for the axioms is not always
clear and even to experts the basic axioms of QM often appear counter-intuitive (Nielsen
and Chuang, 2010).
The aim of this paper is twofold:
◦ to derive quantum mechanics from a single principle of self-consistency;
◦ to show that QM is just the Bayesian theory generalised to the complex Hilbert space.
To this end, we will base our analysis on a gambling system, where a subject, whom we
call Alice, has only to specify which gambles on a certain quantum experiment she is willing
to accept. We require a few simple rules of self-consistency on Alice’s assessments. If the
rules are satisfied, then we say that the assessment are coherent and that Alice is rational.
These coherence rules have a long history in the foundational approaches to traditional
probability as well as decision theory; imposing them in the classical case allows one, for
instance, to derive a very general and powerful version of the Bayesian theory (Smith, 1961;
Walley, 1991; Williams, 1975).
And so essentially do we in this paper: by following the ideas of the classical case while
extending them to the quantum one, we derive a theory of probability apt to work in the
complex Hilbert space. We show that this very theory is QM. It has probabilities (density
matrices), Bayes’ rule (measurement), marginalisation (partial tracing), independence (ten-
sor product). Such a formulation of QM is an actual generalisation of the Bayesian theory,
which we recover as a special case. But it obviously exhibits also peculiar behaviours that
are impossible to obtain in the classical case, such as a strong form of stochastic depen-
dence: entanglement – and in fact the QM violation of Bell’s inequalities is tantamount, in
our formulation, to the violation of the probabilistic notion of Fre´chet bounds.
The idea of justifying QM from rationality principles on a gambling system is not new.
It has been described in pioneering work about the Bayesian interpretation of QM (QBism)
(Appleby, 2005a,b; Caves et al., 2002, 2007; Fuchs, 2002, 2003a,b; Fuchs and Schack, 2004,
2011, 2013; Mermin, 2014; Schack, 2003; Schack et al., 2001; Timpson, 2008) and Pitowsky’s
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quantum gambles (Pitowsky, 2003, 2006). QBism and Pitowsky aim at proving the coherence
of an n-dimensional quantum system by considering the probability assignments derived from
QM (via Born’s rule or, more in general, Gleason’s theorem).
Our approach is different. We do not aim at showing that the probabilities derived from
QM are Bayesian; we aim at showing that QM itself is the Bayesian theory, once it is
generalised to work in the complex space of hermitian matrices, Cn×nh – this also shows in
a definite sense that QM is strongly self-consistent. We obtain this result by bringing to
light a duality relation between sets of gambles defined on Cn×nh and density matrices, in the
same way as there is a duality relation between sets of real-valued gambles and probabilities
in the classical case.
A. Outline of the paper
Section II reviews the foundations of de Finetti’s Bayesian theory from the point of view
of the theory of coherent sets of desirable gambles. It discusses the inherent generalisa-
tion of this theory that allows it to deal smoothly also with sets of probabilities (Bayesian
robustness/imprecise probability).
Section III develops the foundations of the desirability theory in the quantum case.
Section IV works out the duality relation between gambles and “probabilities” in the
quantum case. On this basis it derives from desirability the first axiom of quantum mechan-
ics. It also derives Born’s rule as a direct outcome of the notion of expectation in the theory
of desirability and discusses the relation to Gleason’s theorem.
Section V derives the second axiom of QM from the desirability definition of conditioning,
and its implications when it is used as a rule to compute future beliefs.
Section VI derives the third axiom of QM from considerations of temporal coherence:
that is, the fact that the desirability theory should be self-consistent also through time.
Section VII derives the fourth axiom of quantum mechanics as a consequence of the
definition of “stochastic” independence in desirability. It also shows that entanglement is
a strong form of “stochastic” independence that is specific to quantum desirability, in that
it cannot be achieved in the classical case; it discusses how this leads to the violation of
Fre´chet bounds in the quantum case, that is, Bell’s inequalities.
Section VIII presents a discussion of QBism and a comparison with the approach pre-
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sented in this paper.
Section IX concludes the paper. The proofs of all the main results are reported in the
Appendix.
II. PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY
A. Axiomatisation of probability
Modern probability theory was axiomatised by Kolmogorov (1950). By the Kolmogorov
axiomatisation, probability is defined on a probability space, which is a triplet (Ω,F , P ),
where Ω is an arbitrary set (elements ω of Ω are said to be elementary events), F is an
arbitrary σ-algebra of subsets of Ω (elements of F are said to be events) and P is a measure
that yields values in the segment [0, 1] of the real line (first axiom), normalised by the
condition P (Ω) = 1 (second axiom) and satisfying the σ-additivity condition P (∪∞i=1Ai) =∑∞
i=1 P (Ai) for each sequence (Ai : i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ) of pairwise disjoint members of F (third
axiom).
Kolmogorov theory also contains the additional axiomatic definition of conditional prob-
abilities. By definition, the conditional probability of B given the event A is defined as
follows (fourth axiom):
P (B|A) = P (A ∩B)
P (A)
with P (A) > 0.
From these axioms, it is also possible to derive marginalisation, law of total probability,
and so on.
To derive this formulation, Kolgomorov exploited Borel’s measure-theoretic approach to
probability (hence σ-additivity). The axioms were instead motivated by Kolmogorov from
ideas by von-Mises about the frequency definition of probability. He used frequency reasons
to take the segment [0, 1], define the normalisation P (Ω) = 1 and to motivate additivity of
probability and the definition of conditioning (Kolmogorov, 1950).
B. Subjective probability and desirability
De Finetti (1937) established a different foundation of probability theory on the notion
of “coherence” (self-consistency). This means, roughly speaking, that one should assign and
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manipulate probabilities so as not to possibly be made a sure loser in a gambling system
based on them. De Finetti used this approach to give a subjectivistic foundation to the
theory of probability,1 by showing that all probability axioms could be derived by imposing
the principle of self-consistency alone on a subject’s odds about an uncertain experiment.
The subject is considered rational if she chooses her odds so that there is no bet that leads
her to a sure loss (no Dutch books are possible). In this way, since mathematically odds are
the inverse of probabilities, de Finetti provided a justification of Kolmogorov’s axioms as a
rationality criterion on a gambling system.
Williams (1975) and then Walley (1991) have shown that it is possible to justify proba-
bility in a way that is even simpler, more general and elegant. To understand this betting
framework, we consider an experiment whose outcome ω belongs to a certain space of pos-
sibilities Ω (e.g., the experiment may be tossing a coin or throwing a dice). We can model
Alice’s beliefs about ω by asking her whether she accepts to engage in certain risky trans-
actions, called gambles, whose outcome depends on the actual outcome of the experiment.
Mathematically, a gamble is a bounded real-valued function on Ω, g : Ω → R, which is
interpreted as an uncertain reward in a linear utility scale. If Alice accepts a gamble g, this
means that she commits herself to receive g(ω) utiles2 if the experiment is performed and
the outcome of the experiment eventually happens to be the event ω ∈ Ω. Since g(ω) can
be negative, Alice can also lose utiles. Therefore Alice’s acceptability of a gamble depends
on her knowledge about the experiment.
The set K of gambles that Alice accepts is called her set of desirable (or acceptable)
gambles. One such set is said to be coherent when it satisfies a few simple rationality
criteria. These criteria are very easy to understand; we introduce them with an example.
Example 1. Let us assume that the uncertain experiment is about the outcome of the toss of a
fair coin: Ω = {Head, Tail}. Before the experiment, the Bookie asks Alice what are the gambles
that she is willing to accept. A gamble g in this case has two components g(Head) = g1 and
g(Tail) = g2. If Alice accepts g then she commits herself to receive/pay g1 if the outcome is Head
and g2 if Tail. Since a gamble is in this case an element of R2, g = (g1, g2), we can plot the gambles
1 De Finetti actually considered only finitely additive probabilities. Since in the paper we always assume
Ω to be finite, σ-additivity and finite additivity coincide.
2 Abstract units of utility, indicating the satisfaction derived from an economic transaction; we can approx-
imately identify it with money provided we deal with small amounts of it (de Finetti, 1974, Sec. 3.2.5.).
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Alice accepts in a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system with coordinate axes g1 and g2.
First, the Bookie asks Alice if she is willing to accept g = (1, 1) – this gamble means that she
receives 1 utile, no matter the result of the experiment. Alice accepts this gamble, given that it
increases her wealth without ever decreasing it. Similarly, she accepts h = (1, 0), f = (0, 1), any
positive scaling of these gambles νf, γh (with ν, γ > 0) and their sum f + h. This means that
she is also accepting any positive combination νf + γh, since the resulting vector is always non-
negative. Summing up, Alice always accepts the first quadrant, Figure 1(a). We have excluded
the gamble (0, 0), because we will only consider gambles that are strictly desirable for Alice, that
is, gambles for which she always gains something (even an epsilon):
K1 = {g ∈ R2 | g 6= 0, gi ≥ 0}.
Then, the Bookie asks Alice if she is willing to accept g = (−1,−1). Since she loses 1 utile no
matter the outcome of the experiment, Alice does not accept this gamble, nor any gamble νf + γh
with h = (−1, 0), f = (0,−1) and ν, γ > 0. In other words, Alice always rejects the third quadrant,
Figure 1(b).
Then the Bookie asks Alice about g = (−0.1, 1) – she loses 0.1 if Head and wins 1 if Tail. Since
Alice knows that the coin is fair, she accepts this gamble as well as all the gambles of the form νg
with ν > 0, because this is just a change of scale. Similarly, she accepts all the gambles νg+γh for
any ν, γ > 0 and h ∈ K1, since these gambles are even more favourable for her. Now, the Bookie
asks Alice about g = (1,−0.1) and the argument is symmetric to the above case. We therefore
obtain the following set of desirable gambles (see Figure 1(c)):
K2 = {g ∈ R2 | 10g1 + g2 ≥ 0 and g1 + 10g2 ≥ 0}.
Finally, the Bookie asks Alice about g = (−1, 1) – she looses 1 if Head and wins 1 if Tail.
Alice could accept this gamble because she knows that the coin is fair. However, since we are
only considering gambles that are strictly desirable for Alice, she only accepts gambles of the form
g = (−1, 1) + ε with ε > 0 and, by rationality, all gambles νg with ν > 0 and νg + γh for any
ν, γ > 0 and h ∈ K2. A similar conclusion can be derived for the symmetric gamble g = (1,−1).
Figure 1(d) is her final set of desirable gambles about the experiment concerned with the toss of a
fair coin, which in a formula becomes
K3 = {g ∈ R2 | g1 + g2 > 0}.
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Alice does not accept any other gamble. In fact, if Alice would also accept for instance h =
(−2, 0.5) then, since she has also accepted g = (1 + ε,−1), i.e., g ∈ K3, she must also accept g + h
(because this gamble should also be favourable to her). However, g + h = (−1 + ε,−0.5) is always
negative, Alice always loses utiles in this case. In other words, by accepting h = (−2, 0.5) Alice
incurs a sure loss – she is irrational.
g1
g2
a
g1
g2
b
g1
g2
c
g1
g2
d
FIG. 1: Alices’ sets of coherent strictly desirable gambles for the experiment of tossing a
fair coin.
Summing up, the rationality criteria are:
1. Any gamble g 6= 0 such that g(ω) ≥ 0 for each ω ∈ Ω must be desirable for Alice, given
that it may increase Alice’s capital without ever decreasing it (accepting partial
gain).
2. Any gamble g such that g(ω) ≤ 0 for each ω ∈ Ω must not be desirable for Alice, given
that it may only decrease Alice’s capital without ever increasing it (avoiding partial
loss).
3. If Alice finds g to be desirable, that is, g ∈ K, then also λg must be desirable for her
for any 0 < λ ∈ R (positive homogeneity). We can think of this rule simply as an
invariance to a change of currency.
4. If Alice finds g1 and g2 desirable, that is, g1, g2 ∈ K, then she also must accept g1 + g2,
i.e., g1 + g2 ∈ K (additivity).
If the set of desirable gamble K satisfies these property we say that it is coherent, or,
equivalently, that Alice is rational.
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Note how by these four axioms we express some truly minimal requirements: the first
means that Alice likes to increase her wealth; the second that she does not like to decease
it; the third and fourth together simply rephrase the assumption that Alice’s utility scale
is linear. In spite of the simple character of these requirements, these four axioms alone
define a very general theory of probability, of which, for instance, the Bayesian theory of
probability is a special case (Walley, 1991; Williams, 1975). In the next sections we will in
fact show how we can derive probability from desirability. This points also to the fact that
the kind of coherence embodied by the four axioms above is more primitive that the usual
Dutch-book coherence; it does subsume it but it is more fundamental.
Apart from allowing us to derive the traditional axioms and theory of probability, the
above desirability setting allows us to easily define operations such as marginalisation, con-
ditioning, independence, integration, etc., all at the level of gambles (Couso and Moral,
2011; de Cooman et al., 2011; Miranda, 2008; Miranda and Zaffalon, 2010; Vicig, 2000). We
point the reader to Augustin et al. (2014) for a recent survey. Such operations become the
common operations we are used to when we focus on the probabilistic statements we derive
from desirability.
The theory of desirable gambles cannot be used directly for QM, because of the presence
of complex numbers. In the next section, we verify that we can extend such a theory to
the space of complex n× n matrices (n-dimensional quantum system). In doing so, we will
also extend and employ the operations mentioned above, as taken from the original theory
of desirability, into the generalised version needed by QM.
III. QUANTUM DESIRABILITY
Our aim in the next sections is to lay the foundations of the theory of desirability in
the case of QM. We call it quantum desirability. We will show that quantum desirability
includes the theory of desirable gambles presented in the previous section as a particular
case. We will exploit this fact to present at the same time examples of quantum desirability
and classical desirability (e.g., quantum vs. classical coins). This is done in order to help the
reader, who is not familiar with desirability, to understand the connection between classical
desirability and probability as well as quantum desirability and quantum mechanics.
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A. Foundations of desirability
The first step for defining quantum desirability is to specify what is the experiment, what
is a gamble on this experiment and how the payoff for the gamble is computed. To this end,
we consider an experiment relative to an n-dimensional quantum system and two subjects:
the gambler (Alice) and the bookmaker. The n-dimensional quantum system is prepared by
the bookmaker in some quantum state. We assume that Alice has her personal knowledge
about the experiment (possibly no knowledge at all).
1. The bookmaker announces that he will measure the quantum system along its n or-
thogonal directions and so the outcome of the measurement is an element of Ω =
{ω1, . . . , ωn}, with ωi denoting the elementary event “detection along i”. Mathemati-
cally, it means that the quantum system is measured along its eigenvectors,3 i.e., the
projectors4 Π∗ = {Π∗1, . . . ,Π∗n} and ωi is the event “indicated” by the i-th projector.
The bookmaker is fair, meaning that he will correctly perform the experiment and
report the actual results to Alice.
2. Before the experiment, Alice declares the set of gambles she is willing to accept.
Mathematically, a gamble G on this experiment is a Hermitian matrix in Cn×n, the
space of all Hermitian n× n matrices being denoted by Cn×nh . We will denote the set
of gambles Alice is willing to accept by K ⊆ Cn×nh .
3. By accepting a gamble G, Alice commits herself to receive γi ∈ R utiles if the outcome
of the experiment eventually happens to be ωi. The value γi is defined from G and Π
∗
as follows:
Π∗iGΠ
∗
i = γiΠ
∗
i for i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
It is a real number since G is Hermitian.
This gambling system has been partially inspired by that of Pitowsky (2003).5
We recall that, by accepting a gamble G, Alice commits herself to receive γi whatever
event, indicated by Π∗i , occurs. Since γi can be negative, Alice can lose utiles and hence
3 We mean the eigenvectors of the density matrix of the quantum system.
4 A projector Π is a set of n positive semi-definite matrices in Cn×nh such that ΠiΠk = 0, (Πi)2 = Πi = (Πi)†,∑n
i=1 Πi = I.
5 The important difference is that we define the gambles and payoffs directly in Cn×nh .
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the desirability of a gamble depends on Alice’s beliefs about the quantum experiment. Note
that in the paper we use the starred notation, Π∗ = {Π∗i }ni=1, to denote the n orthogonal
directions of the quantum state prepared by the bookmaker. Conversely, a generic set of
projectors is denoted without star, Π = {Πi}ni=1.
Example 2. Classical coin. Let us consider again the classical coin tossing experiment. The
possible outcomes are Ω = {Head, Tail} and they can be associated one-to-one to the canonical
basis on R2, Ω = {e1, e2}. The measurement Π∗ here can be represented by the projectors
Π∗1 = e1e
T
1 =
 1 0
0 0
 , Π∗2 = e2eT2 =
 0 0
0 1
 ,
and therefore they are completely known by Alice. Since Π∗iGΠ
∗
i depends only on the diagonal
elements of G, without loss of generality Alice can restrict herself to only consider gambles G that
are diagonal Hermitian matrices. Since the diagonal elements of a diagonal Hermitian matrix are
real numbers, the gambles are actually vectors g = (g1, g2) in R2, i.e., G = diag(g). Therefore, the
experiment payoffs are:
Π∗1GΠ
∗
1 = g1Π
∗
1, Π
∗
2GΠ
∗
2 = g2Π
∗
2,
i.e., Alice receives g1 if the result of the toss is Head and g2 if it is Tail. For instance, the gamble
g = (1, 1) means that no matter the result of the experiment Alice will receive 1 utile, while the
gamble h = (1,−2) means that she will receive 1 utile if the outcome is Head and she will lose
2 utiles if Tail. If Alice accepts the gamble h, this means that she believes that Head is more
probable than Tail. Classical desirability can be regarded to be only about gambles that are
diagonal Hermitian matrices.
Example 3. Quantum coin. Let us consider now a two-level quantum system (qubit) such as
for instance the vertical or horizontal polarisation of a photon Ω = {V,H}. The gambles G are
in this case two-dimensional Hermitian matrices (n = 2). If Alice accepts the gamble G and
the experiment is performed, she receives γ1 utiles if the photon is detected along the direction
indicated by Π∗1 and γ2 if the photon is detected along the direction Π∗2. For instance, the gamble
G1 = I = [1, 0; 0, 1] should be desirable for Alice because no matter Π
∗ and the outcome of the
experiment Π∗i , she will always receive 1 utile, since Π
∗
i IΠ
∗
i = Π
∗
i .
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Consider now the gamble G2 = [1,−ι; ι,−2], with ι being the imaginary unit. Alice knows she
will be rewarded by the bookie as follows:
Π∗1G2Π
∗
1 = γ1Π
∗
1, Π
∗
2G2Π
∗
2 = γ2Π
∗
2,
if Π∗ is performed and the outcome is Π∗1 or, respectively, Π∗2. Alice can decide to accept G2 based
on her beliefs on the quantum system. For instance, if she knows that the directions of the states of
the quantum system are Π∗1 = [1,−ι; ι, 1]/2 and Π∗2 = [1, ι;−ι, 1]/2, then by accepting the gamble
G2 she commits herself to receive 0.25 utile if Π
∗
1 happens and to lose 0.75 utiles if Π
∗
2 happens.
We now recall some well-known results from linear algebra. Each Hermitian matrix G
in Cn×nh can be decomposed as G = UΛU †, where U is an n × n unitary complex matrix,
i.e., UU † = U †U = I, and Λ is diagonal (eigenvalues matrix) with n real-valued diagonal
elements. A matrix G ∈ Cn×nh is said to be:
PSD: Positive Semi-Definite, if all its eigenvalues are positive (denoted as G ≥ 0);
PSDNZ: PSD and non-zero, it is PSD and G 6= 0 (denoted as G  0);
PD: Positive Definite, if all its eigenvalues are strictly positive (denoted as G > 0).
Similar definitions hold for negative semi-definite, negative semi-definite and non-zero, and
negative definite ones. A known result for PSD and PSDNZ matrices is the following. Let
G ∈ Cn×nh , it holds that G ≥ 0 if and only if CGC† ≥ 0 for any matrix C ∈ Cn×n. Moreover,
if G  0 and Π = {Π1, . . . ,Πn} is any projection measurement, then there is j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that ΠjGΠj  0. For the convenience of the reader, the proof of this result is given in
Proposition A.1 in the Appendix.
Let us now go back to our experiment. Denote by H+ = {G ∈ Cn×nh : G  0} the subset
of all PSDNZ matrices in Cn×nh : the set of positive gambles. The set of negative gambles is
similarly given by H− = {G ∈ Cn×nh : G  0}. Alice examines the gambles in Cn×nh and
comes up with the subset K of the gambles that she finds desirable. Alice’s rationality is
characterised as follows.
Alice is rational if the following conditions hold:
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1. Any gamble G ∈ Cn×nh such that G  0 must be desirable for Alice, given that it may
increase Alice’s utiles without ever decreasing them (accepting partial gain). This
means that H+ ⊆ K.
2. Any gamble G ∈ Cn×nh such that G  0 must not be desirable for Alice, given that
it may only decrease Alice’s utiles without ever increasing them (avoiding partial
loss). This means that H− ∩ K = ∅.
3. If Alice finds G desirable, that is G ∈ K, then also νG must be desirable for her for
any 0 < ν ∈ R (positive homogeneity).
4. If Alice finds G1 and G2 desirable, that is G1, G2 ∈ K, then she also must accept
G1 +G2, i.e., G1 +G2 ∈ K (additivity).
To understand these rationality criteria, we must remember that mathematically the
payoff for any gamble G is computed as Π∗iGΠ
∗
i if the outcome of the experiment is the event
indicated by Π∗i . Then the first two rationality criteria above hold no matter the experiment
Π∗ that is eventually performed. In fact, from the properties of PSDNZ matrices discussed
before (see also Proposition A.1), if G  0 then Π∗iGΠ∗i = γiΠ∗i with γ∗i ≥ 0 for any i
and γj > 0 for some j. Therefore, by accepting G  0, Alice can only increase her utiles.
Symmetrically, if G  0 then Π∗iGΠ∗i = γiΠ∗i with γi ≤ 0 for any i. Therefore, Alice must
avoid the gambles G  0 because they can only decrease her utiles. This justifies the first
two rationality criteria. For the last two, observe that
Π∗i (G1 +G2)Π
∗
i = Π
∗
iG1Π
∗
i + Π
∗
iG2Π
∗
i = (γi + ϑi)Π
∗
i ,
where we have exploited the fact that Π∗iG1Π
∗
i = γiΠ
∗
i and Π
∗
iG2Π
∗
i = ϑiΠ
∗
i . Hence, if Alice
accepts G1, G2, she must also accept G1 + G2 because this will lead to a reward of γi + ϑi.
Similarly, if G is desirable for Alice, then also Π∗i (νG)Π
∗
i = νΠ
∗
iGΠ
∗
i should be desirable for
any ν > 0.
In other words, as in the case of classical desirability, the four conditions above state
only minimal requirements: that Alice would like to increase her wealth and not decrease
it (conditions 1 and 2); and that Alice’s utility scale is linear (conditions 3 and 4). The
first two conditions should be plainly uncontroversial. The linearity of the utility scale is
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routinely assumed in the theories of personal, and in particular Bayesian, probability as a
way to isolate considerations of uncertainty from those of value (wealth).
We can characterise K also from a geometric point of view. In fact, from the above
properties, it follows that a coherent set of desirable gambles K is a convex cone6 (positive
scaling and additivity) in Cn×nh that includes H+ (accepting partial gains) and excludes
H− (avoiding partial losses). Without loss of generality we can also assume that K is not
pointed, i.e., 0 /∈ K: Alice does not accept the null gamble.7 A coherent set of desirable
gambles is therefore a non-pointed convex cone.
From now onwards, we assume that Alice’s set of desirable gambles mathematically sat-
isfies the following properties.
Definition III.1. Let K be a subset of Cn×nh . We say that K is a coherent set of strictly
desirable gambles (SDG) if
(S1): K is a non-pointed convex-cone (positive homogeneity and additivity);
(S2): if G  0 then G ∈ K (accepting partial gain);
(S3): if G ∈ K then either G  0 or G−∆ ∈ K for some 0 < ∆ ∈ Cn×nh (openness).
The additional openness property (S3) in Definition III.1 is not necessary for rationality, but
it is technically convenient in this paper as it precisely isolates the kind of models we will
use and hence it makes the derivations simpler. Geometrically, it amounts to excluding from
the set all the gambles that are on the border of the cone, apart from the gambles G  0
that are always desirable (thus, by an abuse of terminology, strictly desirable gambles are
often referred to as open convex cones). Property (S3) can be regarded as an Archimedean
property for desirable gambles. Indeed, when instead of Cn×nh we consider the space Rn,
loosely speaking, it implies that a set of strictly desirable gambles (seen as a non-pointed
open convex cone of Rn) has a corresponding (dual) probabilistic representation that is
equivalent to the set. In Section IV we will show that, mutatis mutandis, the same happens
6 A subset K of a vector space is called convex if it is closed under convex combinations: G,F ∈ K implies
wG + (1 − w)F ∈ K, for any w ∈ [0, 1]. It is called a cone if it is closed under non-zero, positive scalar
multiplication: G ∈ K implies νG ∈ K, for any ν > 0. It can be verified that a cone K is convex if and
only if it is closed under non-zero, positive linear combinations, i.e., iff αG1 + βG2 belongs to K for any
positive scalars α, β > 0 and G1, G2 ∈ K.
7 We will show that this allows us to derive the avoiding partial loss criterion from the accepting partial
gain one.
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in Cn×nh : a set of strictly desirable gambles has a corresponding (dual) representation in
term of density matrices that is equivalent to the set.
As explained in Example 1, property (S3) can also be given a gambling interpretation:
it means that we will only consider gambles that are strictly desirable for Alice; these are
gambles that are either positive (PSDNZ) or for which Alice is willing to pay a positive
amount to have them (an epsilon). We will discuss further on the meaning of buying a
gamble in Section IV.C.
Remark III.2. The assumption that 0 /∈ K implies that SDG also satisfies:
◦ if G  0, then G /∈ K (avoiding partial loss).
Indeed, assume G  0 is in K. Notice that −G  0, and because of the acceptance of partial
gain, −G ∈ K. Thus, by additivity we have that G − G = 0 ∈ K, a contradiction. This
means that a non-pointed cone that includes H+ automatically avoids partial loss.
It is clear from the definition that the minimal SDG is the convex cone K that includes
all G  0 and nothing else, i.e., H+. It characterises a state of full ignorance. Conversely,
an SDG is called maximal if there is no other SDG including it. In terms of rationality, a
maximal SDG is a set of gambles that Alice cannot extend to another SDG by accepting
other gambles while keeping at the same time rationality. It also represents a situation in
which Alice is sure about the state of the system, as we will show in the next examples.
Notice that, while the minimal SDG is unique (H+), there are many distinct maximal SDGs.
This means that, in general, a set of desirable gambles can be extended to different maximal
SDGs.8
To clarify these and the previous definitions, we now list some examples of SDG using
the classical and quantum coin examples.
Example 4. Classical coin. Let us go back to our classical coin example. We consider four
possible situations.
1. Alice is in a complete state of ignorance about the coin (the coin may be heavily biased to
one side or to the other) and so Alice decides to accept only gambles that are non-negative,
8 For the extension to be possible, the original set must at least avoid partial loss, though.
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i.e., all the gambles G = diag(g)  0 with g = (g1, g2) such that g1, g2 ≥ 0. In this way, she
can never lose utiles. We can plot Alice’s SDG in a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate
system. The result is shown in Figure 2(a). Hence, a complete state of ignorance corresponds
to an SDG that coincides with the first quadrant (excluded the zero), i.e., H+.
2. This time Alice has some information about the coin and she accepts taking some risk. Based
on this information, Alice finds the gambles f = (0.8,−0.2) and h = (−0.4, 0.6) desirable
but not strictly (besides the gambles G = diag(g)  0 that are always desirable for her).
This means that Alice’s SDG is this time the cone in Figure 2(b). It is an open cone that
includes all the non-zero non-negative gambles and has as border the rays λf for λ > 0 and
γh for γ > 0.
3. We consider a third situation in which Alice has even more information on the coin and
finds the gambles f = (1,−1) and h = (−1, 1) desirable but not strictly, Figure 2(c). The
resulting SDG is in this case a degenerate cone (a maximal SDG). It is clear (also from the
figure) that a degenerate convex cone cannot be further enlarged by including other gambles,
as it would not be a cone anymore. In this sense it is maximal: there are not other SDGs
including it. We have already seen in Example 1 that this is the SDG corresponding to a fair
coin. We will show in Section IV that a maximal SDG always corresponds to a situation in
which Alice assigns a single probability to Head and Tail. In the previous two cases Alice’s
SDG is more generically represented by a set of probabilities.
4. Finally assume that Alice finds f = (2,−1) and h = (−2, 1) desirable, i.e., f, g ∈ K. Then
we can easily show that K is incoherent. In fact, we have shown that if Alice accepts f and
g she must also accept αf + βg with α, β > 0. However, for α = β = 0.5 we have that
(f +h)/2 = (−0.5,−0.5) ∈ H− and, thus, Alice does not avoid sure (and hence partial) loss;
in this sense, she is irrational. This is a form of Dutch-book incoherence.
In the next section we will give the probabilistic models relative to these three situations.
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FIG. 2: Alices’ sets of coherent strictly desirable gambles corresponding to three different
degrees of beliefs about the classical coin.
Example 5. Quantum coin. Let us go back to the qubit, Example 3. We consider four possible
situations that are equivalent to those discussed for the classical coin.
1. Alice is completely ignorant about the quantum system. Hence, she decides to accept only
gambles that cannot decrease her utiles (no matter the outcome of the quantum experiment).
This means that her SDG coincides with K1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} – she only accepts non-
zero non-negative gambles. To plot the full K1, now we need four dimensions. We exploit
the fact that any Hermitian matrix can be decomposed as
G =
 v + z x− ιy
x+ ιy v − z
 = vI + xσx + yσy + zσz, (2)
where (x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 and σi are the Pauli matrices (a basis for C2×2h ):
σx =
0 1
1 0
 , σy =
0 −ι
ι 0
 , σz =
1 0
0 −1
 . (3)
The matrix G is PSDNZ provided that v > 0 and x2 + y2 + z2 ≤ v2 and therefore
K1 = {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v 6= 0,
√
x2 + y2 + z2 ≤ v},
which is the four-dimensional version of the “ice cream cone”. Figure 3(a) shows a three-
dimensional slice of this cone.
2. Assume now Alice has more information about the quantum system, she is ready to take
some risk. We assume that her SDG K2 coincides with
K2 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(G†D1) > 0 and Tr(G†D2) > 0},
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where Tr denotes the trace and D1 = diag(0.2, 0.8), D2 = diag(0.6, 0.4). It can be verified
that K2 is a valid SDG. From K2 it follows for instance that she finds the gambles
G1 =
 3 0
0 −0.5
 , G2 =
 10 1− ι
1 + ι −2

to be desirable. We can plot Alice’s SDG also in this case exploiting Pauli’s matrix decom-
position (2) of G. We obtain that
Tr(G†D1) = 0.2(v + z) + 0.8(v − z) > 0, T r(G†D2) = 0.6(v + z) + 0.4(v − z) > 0,
which define two open hyper-spaces in R4; whence
K2 = {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v 6= 0,
√
x2 + y2 + z2 ≤ v}
∪ {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | 0.2(v + z) + 0.8(v − z) > 0, 0.6(v + z) + 0.4(v − z) > 0}.
The projection of K2 on the two-dimensional plane of coordinates (v + z, v − z) is equal to
the convex cone in Figure 2(b).
3. Alice’s SDG K3 this time coincides with
K3 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(G†D) > 0}, with D =
1
2
 1 −ι
ι 1
 .
An example of gamble that is desirable is G = [1,−ι; ι,−2], since Tr(G†D) = 0.5 > 0. It can
be verified that K3 is a valid SDG and is also a degenerate cone (maximal SDG). To show
that, let us consider H = F − εI /∈ K3 such that Tr(F †D) ≤ 0 and so Tr(F †D)− εTr(D) =
Tr(F †D)− ε < 0 for any ε > 0 (we have exploited Tr(D) = 1). Then consider G = −H. G
is in K3 because Tr(G†D) = −Tr(H†D) > 0 for any ε > 0. Since H − H = 0, K3 cannot
include any further gamble while remaining SDG (for any ε > 0, openness).
We will show that a maximal SDG denotes a situation in which Alice uses a single density
matrix to represent her beliefs about the state of the quantum system. By exploiting Pauli’s
matrix decomposition (2) of G, we obtain that Tr(G†D) = v + y > 0. The projection of K3
on (v, y) is shown in Figure 3(c).
4. Finally, assume that Alice’s SDG K4 includes the gambles
G1 =
 1 −ι
ι −2
 , G2 =
 −2 ι
−ι 1
 ;
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then she is irrational. In fact, desirability of G1, G2 implies desirability of αG1 + βG2.
Considered α = β = 0.5, we have that (G1 + G2)/2 < 0; Alice does not avoid sure loss.
Again this is a form of Dutch-book incoherence.
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FIG. 3: Projection of Alice’s sets of coherent strictly desirable gambles corresponding to
three different degrees of beliefs about the quantum system.
IV. FIRST AXIOM OF QM
The aim of this section is to derive the first axiom of QM as a direct consequence of
Alice’s rationality. The first axiom states:
Axiom I: associated to any isolated physical system is a complex vector space with inner
product (that is, a Hilbert space) known as the state space of the system. The system is
completely described by its density operator, which is a positive operator ρ with trace one,
acting on the state space of the system.
We will proceed in two steps. First, by exploiting the natural duality in Hilbert spaces
defined by the inner product, we will show that the dual of a coherent set of strictly desirable
gambles is always included in the set of positive operators (PSD matrices). Second, by
imposing a further property to the duality transformation, i.e., that it has to transform
constants to constants – or, in other words, that it has to preserve the utility scale –, we will
prove that the dual of a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles is a closed and convex set
of trace one positive operators : i.e., a closed and convex set of density matrices ρ. Imposing
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the last property can be regarded as a “normalisation” in the space of positive operators;
for this reason there is no loss of generality in doing so.
A. Duality of coherence
In mathematics, any vector space V has a corresponding dual vector space V • consisting
of all linear functionals on V . The space Cn×nh is a vector space and, therefore, we can define
its dual by means of the standard inner product on Cn×nh :
G ·R = Tr(G†R),
with R,G ∈ Cn×nh . By using the inner product, we start by defining a general – and standard,
see, e.g., Aliprantis and Tourky (2007, Sec. 2.2) – notion of dual for any subset of Cn×nh .
Definition IV.1. Let C be a subset of Cn×nh . Its dual set is defined as
C• = {R ∈ Cn×nh | G ·R ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ C}. (4)
A set of strictly desirable gambles K is a subset of Cn×nh and, therefore, we can define its
dual through the transformation (4). We can easily show that the dual is
K• = {R ∈ Cn×nh | R ≥ 0, G ·R ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ K}. (5)
This means that the dual set of an SDG includes only positive operators, i.e., Hermitian
matrices that are PSD. This result follows by the fact that, as stated by condition (S2) in
Definition III.1, K includes all PSDNZ matrices. In fact, take the PSDNZ gamble G = uiu†i
with 0 6= ui ∈ Cn and so G ∈ K (since G  0) then:
G ·R = Tr(G†R) = Tr(uiu†iR) = Tr(u†iRui) = u†iRui;
but u†iRui must be greater than zero for R to be in K•. Since u†iRui ≥ 0 must hold for
any ui, this implies that R ≥ 0 by definition of PSD matrix. It follows immediately from
the definitions that the set K• is a closed convex cone. This is proven in the Appendix,
Proposition A.2. We therefore know that the dual of an SDG only includes PSD matrices
(R ≥ 0), and it is a closed convex cone. It can also be verified that when Alice is in a full
state of ignorance, i.e., K = H+, then K• = {R ∈ Cn×nh | R ≥ 0}, i.e., the dual includes all
PSD matrices.
We now impose a further property to the duality transformation (·)•.
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Definition IV.2. We say that a matrix R ∈ Cn×nh preserves constants if
G ·R = Tr(G†R) = c, (6)
for each constant matrix9 G = cI with c ∈ R.
We then ask that members of the dual of a set of gambles preserves constants. The
meaning of adding condition (6) to the definition of the dual set is simply that we aim at
preserving the scale in which utility is measured.10 In such case, the following holds.
Proposition IV.3. Let C be a subset of Cn×nh . If we impose that members of C• preserve
constants, then we obtain the following set:
M = {R ∈ Cn×nh | R ≥ 0, T r(R) = 1, G ·R ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ C}. (7)
The proof of Proposition IV.3 is immediate. Clearly M ⊆ C•. Let us now consider
G = cI with c > 0 that is in C (since G  0). Then for any R ∈ C•, we have that
Tr(G†R) = Tr(cR) = cTr(R). To satisfy (6), we therefore must have cTr(R) = c, which
implies that Tr(R) = 1.
Geometrically, it can be observed thatM is a bounded section of the closed convex cone
C• (it is a conic section) and, therefore, is a closed convex set – it is not a cone anymore.
Since M is a conic section of the dual, it completely characterises C•. Hence, by an abuse
of terminology, we will also refer to M as the dual of C.
When M is (the section of) the dual of a SDG K we call it a quantum credal set.11
The term credal is used becauseM is the dual of Alice’s set of desirable gambles K. In fact,
since K reflects Alice’s beliefs about the quantum system then, by duality, also M reflects
her beliefs about the quantum system.
A Hermitian matrix that is PSD and with trace one is by definition a density matrix
(positive operator with trace one).
9 Here the term constant means matrices that represents constant payoffs. It can be verified that all constant
Hermitian matrices are of the form cI with c ∈ R.
10 Stated in terms of money it means that one euro in the primal remains one euro in the dual.
11 In the classical theory of desirable gambles, a credal set is a closed convex set of probabilities (Augustin
et al., 2014; Levi, 1980; Walley, 1991).
20
Subjective formulation of the first axiom of QM
The dual of Alice’s set of coherent strictly desirables gambles is the quantum credal set:
M = {ρ ∈ Dn×nh | G · ρ ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ K}, (8)
where Dn×nh = {R ∈ Cn×nh | R ≥ 0, T r(R) = 1} is the set of all density matrices.
Note that the above formulation is more general then the first axiom of QM, in the sense
that it gives us more flexibility in modelling uncertainty about a certain experiment. Indeed,
it allows us to consider any situation in between the state of full ignorance K = H+, and
thusM = Dn×nh ,12 and a situation in which Alice is sure about the state of the system, that
is the situation where her coherent sets of strictly desirable gambles is a degenerate cone,
i.e., a maximal SDG. Notice that in the latter case, the dual M includes a single density
matrix, and we thus obtain exactly the first axiom of QM.
Desirability and classical probability
In Example 2, we have seen that a gamble relative to a classical experiment is a diagonal
G = diag(g) with g ∈ Rn. The inner product with ρ gives:
G · ρ = Tr(G†ρ) =
n∑
i=1
giρii,
where ρii denote the diagonal elements of ρ, which are real numbers. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we can also assume that ρ is diagonal. From (8), we can derive that the
dual of the SDG K is:
M =
{
ρ ∈ Dn×nh diagonal
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
giρii ≥ 0 ∀diag(g) ∈ K
}
.
Since ρ is positive, with trace one and diagonal, this can also be rewritten as
M =
{
p ∈ Rn
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
gipi ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ K
}
,
where we have used the substitution pi = ρii, so that pi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. So the dual
M of K in the classical case is a set of probability mass functions. This is exactly standard
12 In QM, the state of maximum ignorance is usually defined as ρ = I/n (I is the identity matrix), but
strictly speaking this is not correct. The single density matrix ρ = I/n means that for Alice all the
directions are equally probable. If we were in the classical coin example this would in fact mean that Alice
is assuming that the coin is fair. This will be clarified in the examples.21
duality in probability and proves the correspondence between SDG and sets of probabilities
in the classical case. This is just a particular case of the theory we have developed here for
quantum mechanics.
Example 6. Classical coin. The three cones discussed in Example 4 are shown in Figure 4 (in
blue) together with their dual cones (in red) K•. The (quantum) credal sets M are equal to the
intersection of K• with the line {p ≥ 0 | ∑2i=1 pi = 1} (normalisation, black line). Note that the
dual of the set of non-zero non-negative gambles is the first quadrant Figure 4(a), while the dual
of a maximal cone is a line – see Figure 4(c) – whose intersection with {p ≥ 0 |∑2i=1 pi = 1} gives
the point p = (0.5, 0.5), i.e., the probability mass function of a fair coin.
Let us discuss the subjective interpretation of the three cases. The (quantum) credal set of the
state of full ignorance is the set of all probability mass functions: for Alice everything is possible.
In the second case, the (quantum) credal set is equal to the closed convex set of probability mass
functions:
M2 = {(0.2, 0.8)w + (1− w)(0.6, 0.4) with w ∈ [0, 1]}.
Alice believes now that the probability of head is in the interval [0.2, 0.6] and, thus, the probability
of tail in [0.4, 0.8]. In the third case Alice is sure that the coin is fair. A maximal SDG corresponds
to a single probability mass function: M3 = {(0.5, 0.5)}.
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FIG. 4: Dual sets for the classical coin.
Example 7. Quantum Coin. Let us go back to the qubit of Example 5.
From (9), the dual of the first SDG K1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} is M = Dn×nh ; it is the set of
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all valid density matrices, which is clearly a state of complete ignorance. Also in this case we can
plot M exploiting Pauli’s matrix decomposition (2):
ρ =
0.5 + z x− ιy
x+ ιy 0.5− z
 = 1
2
I + xσx + yσy + zσz.
Note that Tr(ρ) = 1, but it must also be PSD: this means that x2 + y2 + z2 ≤ 14 , which is the
equation of a sphere (the Bloch sphere) – see Figure 5(a).
For the second cone,
K2 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0}
∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(G†D1) > 0 and Tr(G†D2) > 0},
with D1 = diag(0.2, 0.8) and D2 = diag(0.6, 0.4); we have that the quantum credal set coincides
with
M2 = {ρ = wD1 + (1− w)D2 | w ∈ [0, 1]}.
This is the set of all density matrices obtained as convex combinations of D1, D2. In fact, first
note that Tr(wD1 + (1 − w)D2) = 1 and wD1 + (1 − w)D2 ≥ 0 and so M2 is a set of valid
density matrices. Moreover, it is clear that for any G such that Tr(G†D1) > 0 and Tr(G†D2) > 0,
Tr(G†(wD1 + (1− w)D2)) > 0 for any w ∈ [0, 1]. The set M2 is shown in Figure 5(b) (red line),
inside the Bloch sphere. This is equivalent to the second case described in Example 6. Alice believes
that the density matrix of the quantum system belongs to the closed convex set wD1 + (1−w)D2
with w ∈ [0, 1]. Note that this convex combination does not indicate a mixing state, it means
we are considering all density matrices that can be obtained as wD1 + (1 − w)D2. They are all
mixed density matrices for w ∈ [0, 1], since D1, D2 are mixed states and any convex combination
of mixed states is mixed too.
In the third case, the dual of Alice’s SDG is
K3 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(G†D) > 0}, with D =
1
2
 1 −ι
ι 1
 ,
and M3 = {ρ = D} is made of a single density matrix. It is a pure state, because it is in the
border of the Bloch sphere. The set M3 is shown in Figure 5(b) (red point), inside the Bloch
sphere. Alice believes that the state of the quantum system is ρ = D. Maximal SDGs correspond
to single density matrices (non necessarily “pure states”).
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FIG. 5: Credal quantum sets for the quantum coin in the three cases.
B. The representation theorem
To fully deduce the first axiom of QM as a consequence of Alice’s rationality, we must also
prove that the duality map (·)• : K 7→ M establishes a bijection between strictly desirable
sets of gambles K and quantum credal setsM. This can be done by firstly verifying that (8)
can also be rewritten as (Appendix, Proposition A.3):
M = {ρ ∈ Dn×nh | G  0 or G · ρ > 0 ∀G ∈ K}, (9)
which means that M includes all ρ ∈ Dn×nh such that G · ρ > 0 for all G ∈ K that are not
G  0. Note that M = Dn×nh whenever K includes only PSDNZ matrices (G  0). The
subjective interpretation of (9) is straightforward: Alice always accepts the gambles G  0
and, thus, they are not informative on Alice’s beliefs about the quantum system. The latter
are indeed determined by the gambles that are not G  0. From these considerations, it
can easily be derived that the inverse of (·)•, i.e. (·)◦ :M 7→ K, is
M◦ = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | G · ρ > 0 ∀ρ ∈M}. (10)
We observe that the dual of a quantum credal setM is the union of the set of all the gambles
G  0 with the gambles G · ρ > 0, ρ ∈ M. The fact that we always include the gambles
G  0 can be read as a consequence of rationality: those gambles are always desirable for
Alice.
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The proof that (10) is the inverse of (9) is a consequence of the following equivalences:13
Theorem IV.4 (Representation theorem). It holds that
◦ (K•)◦ = K for every SDG K and
◦ (M◦)• =M for every quantum credal set M.
Any SDG is in correspondence with a closed convex set of density matrices and vice versa.
Assume that M = {ρˆ}, then from (10) it follows that
M◦ = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | G · ρˆ = Tr(G†ρˆ) > 0},
and in Example 5, case 3, we have shown that this defines a maximal SDG. Therefore,
maximal SDGs are in a one-to-one correspondence with singleton quantum credal sets, i.e.,
quantum credal sets including a single density matrix.
C. Coherent previsions, Born’s rule and Gleason theorem
A coherent set of desirable gambles implicitly defines a probabilistic model for the quan-
tum system. The way to see this is to consider gambles of the form G − cI, where c is a
real value so that cI is used as a constant gamble here, and G ∈ Cn×nh is any gamble. Say
that Alice is willing to accept the gamble G− cI. From a behavioural point of view, we can
reinterpret this by saying that she is willing to buy gamble G at price c, since she is giving
away c utiles while gaining G. Focusing on the supremum price for which the transaction is
desirable for Alice, leads us to the following:
Definition IV.5. Let K be a SDG. For all G ∈ K,
P (G) = sup {c ∈ R | G− cI ∈ K} (11)
is called the coherent lower prevision of G.
A coherent upper prevision is instead defined as
P (G) = inf {c ∈ R | cI −G ∈ K} . (12)
13 The proof of Theorem IV.4 can be found in the Appendix.
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Condition (12) makes it clear that the coherent upper prevision for a gamble G is Alice’s
infimum selling price for it. It should also be observed that lower and upper previsions are
conjugate: P (G) = −P (−G).
The terminology “prevision” is borrowed from de Finetti. It should be clear, however,
that previsions are nothing else but expectations.14
Proposition IV.6. Consider SDG K and its dual M. Then we have that, for every G ∈
Cn×nh ,
P (G) = inf
ρ∈M
Tr(G†ρ), P (G) = sup
ρ∈M
Tr(G†ρ). (13)
This shows that coherent lower (resp. upper) previsions are just the lower (resp. upper)
envelope of the expectations of G computed w.r.t. the set of density matrices M.
Indeed, first notice that, for any ρ ∈ Dn×nh , (G − cI) · ρ = Tr((G − cI)†ρ) = Tr(G†ρ) −
cTr(ρ). But since Tr(ρ) = 1, we get that
(G− cI) · ρ = Tr(G†ρ)− c. (14)
Since we are looking for the supremum c such that G−cI is still in K, by characterisation (10)
and (14) we obtain that G− cI ∈ K, provided that Tr(G†ρ)− c > 0 for all ρ ∈M (M being
the dual of K). Since Tr(G†ρ)− c > 0 for all ρ ∈M, it follows that
c ≤ inf
ρ∈M
Tr(G†ρ) (15)
holds for any c ∈ R such that G−cI ∈ K. Since c < infρ∈M Tr(G†ρ) implies that G−cI ∈ K,
necessarily P (G) = infρ∈M Tr(G†ρ).
Equation (13) is important and gives us a way to compute coherent lower and upper
previsions in terms of a set of density matrices ρ. Recall that we may give rise to a set
of density matrices as a consequence of Alice’s total or partial ignorance about a quantum
system. When Alice’s beliefs correspond to a maximal SDG instead, we get thatM includes
only a single density matrix, and from (13) we get the standard expectation in QM: P (G) =
P (G) = Tr(G†ρ). The converse, that P (G) = P (G) for any G ∈ K implies M = {ρ}, is
proven in the Appendix, Proposition A.4.
14 In QM the expected value of an operator H (Hermitian matrix) is defined as Tr(H†ρ), see for instance
Nielsen and Chuang (2010).
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In the case that P (G) = P (G), their common value is denoted by P (G) and is called the
linear prevision of G. A linear prevision is just an expectation w.r.t. a density matrix ρ;
it is coherent because we have shown that so is ρ.
Born’s rule
Born’s rule is a law of QM that gives the probability that a measurement on a quantum
system will yield a given result. We will show how we can derive it. Assume thatM = {ρˆ}
includes a single density matrix so that, for G = Πi, P (Πi) = P (Πi) = P (Πi). We then have
from (13):
P (Πi) = inf
ρ∈M
Tr(Π†iρ) = sup
ρ∈M
Tr(Π†iρ) = Tr(Π
†
i ρˆ) = Tr(ΠiρˆΠi),
where we have exploited Πi = Π
†
i = (Πi)
2. P (Πi) is Alice’s fair buying and selling price for
the event Πi and is therefore related to her probability that such an event happens:
pi := P (Πi) = Tr(ΠiρˆΠi).
We have therefore derived Born’s rule. More, in general, when M is not a singleton,
P (Πi), P (Πi) respectively determine the lower and upper probability of the event indicated
by Πi.
Example 8. Classical coin. Let us go back to our coin in Example 6 and compute the coherent
lower previsions.
In the state of full ignorance, for any diag(g) ∈ Cn×nh
P (g) = inf
p
2∑
i=1
gipi = min
i
gi.
The infimum is taken w.r.t. all probability mass functions and, therefore, the worst case is a
probability mass function that puts all the mass in the minimum element of the vector g ∈ R2.
Clearly, we have that P (G) = maxi gi. In a state of full ignorance, Alice’s expected values for the
payoff of any gamble g is included in [min g,max g].
In the second case, for any diag(g) ∈ Cn×nh
P (G) = inf
p=(0.2,0.8)w+(1−w)(0.6,0.4) with w∈[0,1]
2∑
i=1
gipi = min (g10.2 + g20.8, g10.6 + g20.4) ,
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which means that the lower prevision (expectation) of G is the minimum between the expectations
of g10.2 + g20.8 and g10.6 + g20.4. P (G) can be obtained by computing the maximum.
In the third case, for any diag(g) ∈ Cn×nh
P (G) = P (G) = P (G) =
1
2
g1 +
1
2
g2,
the expectation of g w.r.t. a fair coin.
In the above example, we have assessed that when M includes all probability mass
functions, Alice is in a state of ignorance about the probability of Head and Tail of the coin;
whence we have that P (diag(g)) = mini gi and P (diag(g)) = maxi gi. This means that Alice
only knows that she will receive/pay a quantity belonging to the interval [mini gi,maxi gi].
That is why she only accepts positive gambles in a state of complete ignorance. A similar
result holds for QM. Indeed, assume that Alice is in a state of complete ignorance about the
density matrix associated to the quantum system, i.e., M = Dn×nh . Then it holds that
P (G) = inf
ρ∈Dn×nh
Tr(G†ρ) = λmin(G), P (G) = sup
ρ∈Dn×nh
Tr(G†ρ) = λmax(G),
where λmin(G) (resp. λmax(G)) is the minimum (resp. maximum) eigenvalue of G. This is
proven in the Appendix, Proposition A.5.
Example 9. Quantum coin. Let us go back to the qubit of Example 7 and compute the coherent
lower and upper previsions.
In the state of full ignorance, for any G ∈ Cn×nh
P (G) = inf
ρ∈Dn×nh
Tr(G†ρ) = λmin(G),
where λmin(G) is the minimum eigenvalue of G. The infimum is taken w.r.t. all density matrices
and, therefore, the worst case is a density matrix that puts “all the mass” in the minimum eigenvalue
of G (the density matrix that achieves the minimum is equal to the projector corresponding to
the eigenvector relative to λmin(G)). Clearly, we have that P (G) = λmax(G). In a state of full
ignorance, Alice’s expected values for the payoff of any gamble G is included in [λmin(G), λmax(G)],
as proven in Proposition A.5.
In the second case, for any G ∈ Cn×nh
P (G) = inf
ρ∈M2
Tr(G†ρ) = min
(
Tr(G†D1), T r(G†D2)
)
,
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while P (G) can be obtained computing the maximum.
In the third case, for any G ∈ Cn×nh ,
P (G) = P (G) = P (G) = Tr(G†D),
which is the expectation ofG w.r.t. the density matrixD. In this case, we have a that P (G) = P (G),
because Alice is sure about the density matrix.
Finally we will mention that it is possible to re-derive the first axiom of QM without
explicitly using duality. This can be obtained by defining lower and upper coherent previsions
first and then using Gleason’s theorem (Gleason, 1957) to relate coherent previsions to
density matrices.
Gleason’s theorem: suppose H is a separable Hilbert space of complex dimension at least
n ≥ 3. Then for any quantum probability measure on the lattice Q of self-adjoint projection
operators on H there exists a unique trace class operator ρ such that pi = P (Πi) = Tr(Πiρ)
for any self-adjoint projection Πi in Q.
Now, let us assume that Alice’s SDG K is maximal, given that Gleason’s theorem holds
only for a single density matrix. Then we compute the lower (and upper) prevision induced
by K through (11). Since K is maximal, it holds that P (G) = P (G) = P (G). Since P is
linear, P (G) is completely defined by its value on the projectors: writing G =
∑n
i=1 λiΠi,
then P (G) =
∑n
i=1 λiP (Πi). Then for n ≥ 3, we can invoke Gleason’s theorem and conclude
that there exists a unique trace class operator ρˆ such that pi = P (Πi) = Tr(Πiρˆ). Therefore,
ρˆ is the dual of Alice’s maximal SDG. Since ρˆ is unique, it uniquely defines K (n ≥ 3).
This approach is similar to that developed by Pitowsky (2003, 2006). The main difference
is that the probabilities P (Πi) for us are derived quantities, defined from K. This means
that we start from a coherent set of desirable gambles K and we derive the probabilities
P (Πi) that it induces on the projectors Πi. Moreover, we can immediately state that these
probabilities are coherent (self-consistent) because they are induced by a coherent set of
desirable gambles.
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D. Interpretation of the first axiom in terms of desirability and consequences
In this section we have derived the first axiom of QM as a direct consequence of rationality,
via duality. By duality, we can then conclude that:
1. A closed convex set of density matrices represents Alice’s personal knowledge about the
quantum experiment, that is, her beliefs about the possible results of the experiment.
A state of full ignorance is represented by the set of all density matrices; a state
of maximal personal knowledge is represented by a single density matrix and any
intermediate degree of beliefs is represented by a closed convex set of density matrices.
Quantum states (density matrices) are therefore personal judgements of a subject
about the outcome of a quantum experiment (as standard probabilities are personal
judgements of a subject about the outcome of a classical uncertain experiment).
2. Closed convex sets of density matrices are coherent – in the same way as standard
probabilities are coherent. This means that a subject who states her knowledge about
the quantum experiment in terms of a closed convex set of density matrices cannot be
made a partial loser in a gambling system based on them: the dual set is a coherent
set of desirable gambles and so it avoids partial loss.
3. We have shown that coherent sets of desirable gambles over Cn×nh stand to density
matrices as coherent sets of desirable gambles over Rn stand to probabilities. The
consequence is that the first axiom of QM on density matrices on Cn×nh is struc-
turally and formally equivalent to Kolmogorov’s first and second axioms about
probabilities on Rn. In fact, they can be both derived via duality from a coherent set
of desirable gambles.
V. SECOND AXIOM OF QM
This section shows how to derive a coherent rule for updating beliefs. In particular our
aim is to answer this question: how should Alice change her gambling assessments in the
prospect of obtaining new information in the form of an event? Answering this question will
lead us to derive the second axiom of QM. The second axiom states:
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Axiom II: quantum projection measurements are described by a collection {Πi}ni=1 of pro-
jection operators that satisfy the completeness equation
∑n
i=1 Πi = I. These are operators
acting on the state space of the system being measured. If the state of the quantum system
is ρ immediately before the measurement then the state after the measurement is
ρˆ =
ΠiρΠi
Tr(ΠiρΠi)
,
provided that Tr(ΠiρΠi) > 0 and the probability that result i occurs is given by pi =
Tr(ΠiρΠi).
A. Coherent updating
We initially assume that Alice considers an event “indicated” by a certain projector Πi
in Π = {Πi}ni=1. The information it represents is: an experiment Π is performed and the
event indicated by Πi happens.
15 Under this assumption, Alice can focus on gambles that
are contingent on the event Πi: these are the gambles such that “outside” Πi no utile is
received or due – status quo is maintained –; in other words, they represent gambles that
are called off if the outcome of the experiment is not Πi. Mathematically, these gambles are
of the form
G =
 H if Πi occurs,0 if Πj occurs, with j 6= i.
It is then clear that H = αΠi with α ∈ R since ΠiΠj = 0 for each j 6= i.
In this light, we should define Alice’s conditional set of strictly desirable gambles by
simply restricting the attention to gambles of the form ΠiGΠi = αΠi with G ∈ Cn×nh .
Definition V.1. let K be an SDG, the set obtained as
KΠi =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0 or ΠiGΠi ∈ K
}
(16)
is therefore called the set of desirable gambles conditional on Πi.
16
The conditional set includes all the PSDNZ matrices (they are always desirable for Alice)
and all the gambles G such that ΠiGΠi ∈ K.
15 We assume that the quantum measurement device is a “perfect meter” (an ideal common assumption in
QM), i.e., there are not observational errors – Alice can trust the received information.
16 This is structurally the way conditioning is defined also in the classical theory of desirable gambles, see
Augustin et al. (2014, Ch. 1).
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In the Appendix, Proposition A.6, we show that Alice’s set of desirable gambles condi-
tional on Πi, that is KΠi , is still a non-pointed convex cone that accepts partial gains and
satisfies the openness property. In other words, the conditioning operation transforms SDGs
into SDGs and, therefore, preserves coherence.
We can also compute the dual of KΠi , i.e., MΠi – we call it a conditional quantum
credal set –, by applying the duality transformation (9). It is useful to investigate what
is the relationship between MΠi and the unconditional quantum credal set M that is the
dual of K. The following diagram gives the relationships among K,M,KΠi ,MΠi .
K KΠi
M MΠi
dual
conditioning
conditioning
dual
Let us show how MΠi can be derived by M.
Subjective formulation of the second axiom of QM
Given a quantum credal set M, the corresponding quantum credal set conditional on Πi is
obtained as
MΠi =
{
ΠiρΠi
Tr(ΠiρΠi)
∣∣∣ρ ∈M} , (17)
provided that Tr(ΠiρΠi) > 0 for every ρ ∈ M. Note that the latter condition implies that
Πj /∈M for any j 6= i.
In fact, let us consider the set
{
ΠiρΠi
Tr(ΠiρΠi)
| ρ ∈M
}
, which is a well-defined closed convex
set of density matrices. From (10), its dual SDG can be obtained as{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | G · ΠiρΠiTr(ΠiρΠi) > 0∀ρ ∈M
}
=
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | G · (ΠiρΠi) > 0,∀ρ ∈M
}
,
where the denominator Tr(ΠiρΠi) has been neglected because it is always strictly positive
by hypothesis. Since
G · (ΠiρΠi) = Tr(G†ΠiρΠi) = Tr((ΠiGΠi)†ρ) = (ΠiGΠi) · ρ,
we can rewrite the dual as{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0
} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | (ΠiGΠi) · ρ > 0,∀ρ ∈M} .
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By definition ofM, this set coincides with (16), which is the definition of KΠi . Showing the
inverse (from KΠi to MΠi) is analogous.
In summary, we have derived the second axiom of QM from the usual definition of con-
ditioning in desirability, once it is extended to the quantum case.
Remark V.2. We have called KΠi a conditional set of desirable gambles because it is the
set of desirable gambles conditional on Πi. Note also that the last part of the axiom, that is,
pi = Tr(ΠiρΠi) – the probability that Πi occurs – has been derived in Section IV.C.
Example 10. Classical coin. Let us going back to the classical coin example. Alice considers
the case that the coin has landed Head up and wonders how she should consequently change her
beliefs about the experiment. Even without doing any calculation, it is clear that Alice should only
accept the gambles that give a positive payoff for Head, no matter the payoff for Tail.
Let us show that we can reach the same conclusion by applying the calculus descrived before.
The conditional event is Head, represented by the projector Π1 = e1e
T
1 . To see the gambles that
Alice is willing to accept based on this information, we compute the conditional SDG.
For the first SDG, K(1) = {G ∈ Cn×nh diagonal | G  0}, the conditional SDG is
K(1)Π1 =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh diag. | G  0 or Π1GΠ1 ∈ K(1)
}
=
{
G ∈ Cn×nh diag. | g  0 or g1 > 0
}
.
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. Given the event “the coin has landed head
up”, Alice accepts all gambles G  0 as well as all the gambles G = diag(g1, g2) such that g1 > 0
(the gambles with positive payoff for Head, no matter the value of g2).
For the second and third SDGs, we derive again that
K(2)Π1 = K
(3)
Π1
=
{
G ∈ Cn×nh diagonal | g  0 or g1 > 0
}
,
consistently to what discussed before.
Therefore, in all the cases, the conditional SDG is the green region in Figure 6. By applying (9)
to Alice’s conditional SDG, it can easily be derived that the corresponding conditional set of
probabilities MΠ1 includes only the probability mass function p = (1, 0). In fact, let us consider
the third case K(3)Π1 (SDG relative to the fair coin). In the unconditional case, Alice’s set of density
matrices includes only ρ3 = diag(0.5, 0.5), i.e., she believes that the coin is fair. From (17), we
33
derive that her conditional set of density matrices is
Π1ρ3Π1
Tr(Πiρ3Πi)
=
0.5 0
0 0

0.5
=
1 0
0 0
 ,
whose diagonal is p = (1, 0). This is just Bayes’ rule. We are simply applying Bayes’ rule to the
density matrices (in this case probability mass functions) in M. Under the assumption that “the
coin has landed head up”, Alice’s knowledge about the coin experiment “has collapsed” to p = [1, 0]
– she knows that the result of the experiment is Head. Moreover, this conclusion is the same in
the three cases. If we think about the three cases as associated to three different people, Alice
A, Alice B and Alice C, then all Alices’ conditional SDGs coincide. This shows that, in spite of
the fact that we are considering subjective information, the different subjects may reach the
same conclusion conditional on some evidence.
g1
g2
q
g1
g2
r
g1
g2
s
FIG. 6: Alices’ conditional sets of coherent strictly desirable gambles corresponding to three
different degrees of beliefs about the classical coin.
Example 11. Quantum coin. Let us go back to the qubit of Example 7. In this case, Alice
considers the information “the measurement Π has been performed and the event indicated by the
projector
Π1 =
1
2
 1 −ι
ι 1

has been observed”. In this case, we can immediately conclude that Alice knows the outcome of
the experiment (detection along the direction Π1) – there is not uncertainty. As a consequence,
Alice will only accept the gambles that give a positive payoff w.r.t. Π1, no matter the payoff for
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Π2. Our goal is to compute Alice’s conditional SDG in the three cases.
In the state of full ignorance, Alice’s SDG is K(1) = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} and after conditioning
it becomes
K(1)Π1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0 or Π1GΠ1 = γ1Π1 ∈ K(1)}.
The last condition γ1Π1 ∈ K(1) can also be written as γ1 > 0: apart from the positive gambles, Alice
only accepts those gambles that give positive payoffs along Π1. By Pauli’s matrix decomposition
of G, we obtain that Π1GΠ1 = γ1Π1, with γ1 = v + y, whence the resulting SDG is
K(1)Π1 = {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v + y > 0}.
A slice of this set is shown in Figure 7(a) together with the ice-cream cone – Alice’s SDG before
conditioning. Alice’s SDG is now the hyperspace v + y > 0 (the oblique plane is v + y = 0).
For the second SDG,
K(2) = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(G†D1) > 0 and Tr(G†D2) > 0}
with D1 = diag(0.2, 0.8) and D2 = diag(0.6, 0.4); the conditional SDG is
K(2)Π1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0 or Π1GΠ1 = γ1Π1 ∈ K(2)}.
Since Tr(Π1G
†Π1Di) = Tr(G†Π1DiΠ1), and based on Pauli’s matrix decomposition of G, these
constraints become:
K(2)Π1 = {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v 6= 0 and
√
x2 + y2 + z2 ≤ v} ∪ {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v + y > 0}
= {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v + y > 0},
where we have exploited that Tr(G†Π1DiΠ1) ∝ v + y.
In the third case, Alice’s SDG is
K(3) = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(G†D) > 0}, with D =
1
2
 1 −ι
ι 1
 ,
and after conditioning K(3)Π1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0 or Π1GΠ1 = γ1Π1 ∈ K(3)}, which is equivalent
to
K(3)Π1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(Π1G†Π1D) > 0}.
Note that Tr(Π1G
†Π1D) = Tr(G†Π1DΠ1) = Tr(G†D), where we have exploited that D = Π1,
whence K(3)Π1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | Tr(G†D) > 0}. Again by Pauli’s matrix
decomposition of G, these constraints become:
K(3)Π1 = {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v 6= 0 and
√
x2 + y2 + z2 ≤ v} ∪ {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v + y > 0}
= {(x, y, z, v) ∈ R4 | v + y > 0}.
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In other words, Alice’s state of knowledge about the quantum coin experiment “has collapsed”
to Π1 – she knows that the result of the experiment is “Vertical” along Π1. Therefore Alice is going
to only accept gambles that give positive payoffs contingently to this information. Moreover, this
conclusion is the same in the three cases, as in the case of the classical coin.
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
x
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
y
0
2
4
v
FIG. 7: Alices’ set of coherent conditional SDG (the hyperspace bounded by the plane that
is excluded from Alice’s conditional SDG) corresponding to three different degrees of beliefs
about the quantum state.
B. Conditioning for non-elementary events
So far we have defined conditioning only based on Πi, that is, when Alice considers that
the event indicated by Πi has happened. In analogy with probability we call the event
indicated by Πi an elementary event. In QM, it is called a selective measurement. We
are also interested in non-elementary events, such as “the event indicated by Πi or Πk has
happened” or, more in general, “the event indicated by one of the projectors in the set
{Πj}j∈J has happened with J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}”. In the classical case, these events would for
instance be: “the dice has landed 1 or 2” or “the outcome of the dice is even”. Now we set
out to define a conditioning rule for Alice’s SDG for non-elementary events.
Similarly to before, Alice should focus on gambles that are contingent on one of the events
in {Πj}j∈J . Conditioning for non-elementary events is then defined as
KΠJ =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh
∣∣∣∣∣G  0 or ∑
j∈J
ΠjGΠj ∈ K
}
for some subset J of the indexes {1, . . . , n}. The set KΠJ is again an SDG (Appendix,
Corollary A.7).
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Note that in general
n∑
j=1
ΠjGΠj 6= G.
This means that in case Alice considers that one of the events Πi has happened without
knowing which one in particular (this is called a non-selective measurement in QM), her
SDG after taking into account this information is different from K.
This marks an important difference between the classical and the quantum theory of
desirable gambles. In the classical case, we always have that
∑n
j=1 ΠjGΠj = G, taking into
account that G is diagonal and Πj = eje
T
j , where ej is an element of the canonical basis of
Rn – as discussed in the classical coin examples. For instance, if in the dice example Alice
assumes that the outcome of the dice thrown is a number between 1 and 6, then she does not
change her set of desirable gambles because this information does not change her knowledge
about the outcome of the experiment. In QM, it is different: {Πj}nj=1 is informative evidence.
We can also compute the conditional quantum credal set MΠJ by applying the duality
transformation (9). In this case too, the relationship between MΠJ and the unconditional
quantum credal set M, which is the dual of K, can be obtained as
MΠJ =
{ ∑
j∈J ΠjρΠj∑
j∈J Tr(ΠjρΠj)
∣∣∣ρ ∈M} , (18)
provided that
∑n
j=1 Tr(ΠjρΠj) > 0 for every ρ ∈M.17 The proof is similar to that for (17).
In QM, there are other type of “measurements” apart from the ones determined by projec-
tors, such as Positive Operator Valued Measures (POVM) and variants such as SIC-POVM,
see for instance Nielsen and Chuang (2010). However POVM can be seen as projective
measurements on a higher dimensional space and, therefore, they can be taken into account
by the updating rule developed in this section.
17 Also in this case it should be observed that in general
∑n
j=1 ΠjρΠj 6= ρ and, therefore, QM differers
from classical probability for which we have that:
∑n
j=1 p(y|xi)p(xi) = p(y), which is called the law of
total probability. A violation of the law of total probability implies incoherence in classical probability.
However, we have shown that the updating rule (18) is coherent, as it transforms SDG into SDG. This
means that there is no violation of coherence in QM by using (18).
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C. Conditioning on zero probability events
As a side note, we can show with an example that the formalisation in terms of gambles
is more general than that in terms of density matrices. Consider the case in which
M = {ρ} = {Πj},
that is, the quantum state coincides with a projector, so it is a pure state. Let us assume
that Alice considers the information “the event Πi has been observed” with ΠiΠj = 0. Since
Tr(ΠiρΠi) = 0, we cannot apply (17). Considered that pi = Tr(ΠiρΠi) is the probability of
observing Πi, we have in particular that (17) is not defined for zero probability events – the
second axiom of QM is not defined in this case.
Conversely, the framework of desirable gambles allows us to compute the resulting set
MΠ also in this case. First, we start by defining the dual ofM = {ρ} = {Πj}: by (10), it is
K = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | G · ρ > 0, ∀ρ ∈M} . (19)
We can now compute KΠi , i.e., Alice’s conditional SDG:
KΠi =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0 or ΠiGΠi ∈ K
}
=
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0
} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | ΠiGΠi · ρ > 0,∀ρ ∈M = {Πj}} . (20)
Now observe that
ΠiGΠi · ρ = Tr(G†ΠiρΠi) = 0,
and so the second set in (20) is empty, whence
KΠi =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0
}
.
In this case, Alice only accepts gambles such that G  0, i.e., she is in a state of full ignorance
about the experiment. Hence, quantum desirability naturally addresses a “singularity”
in second axiom of QM within the desirability framework itself rather than resorting to
undefined quantities.
The question of conditioning on zero probability events has a long history in probability,
it is for instance at the heart of Borel-Kolmogorov’s paradox – see, e.g., Jaynes (2003, Sec.
15.7). It falls in the area of non-Archimedean problems. These problems exhibit a kind of
discontinuity for which Archimedean models like probabilities or SDGs are not suited: these
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models are such that the unconditional beliefs they represent are not informative enough
to constrain (by coherence) conditional beliefs in the case of zero probability events. It is
precisely for this reason that KΠi is vacuous. On the technical side, this happens because
the information needed to constrain conditional beliefs under zero-probability events has to
lie in the border of the cone of desirable gambles: and the border is not part of an SDG by
definition. Using coherent sets of desirable gambles that drop the openness condition (S3),
and hence are more general than SDGs, allows in fact non-vacuous conditional beliefs to be
obtained also in the non-Archimedean case (we do not pursue this path any further as it is
out of the scope of the present paper).
D. Strong temporal coherence – part I
So far we have implicitly assumed that Alice has assessed her beliefs about the quantum
experiment at a certain defined time (say, present time, t0). We have taken care not to
make any statement about the evolution of Alice’s beliefs in time. This may sound strange
in that we have considered updated beliefs. However, strictly speaking, also updated beliefs
are present-time beliefs: they are Alice’s current beliefs under the assumption that the
conditional event occurs. They bear no implication on Alice’s actual future beliefs after the
event has occurred.
This is quite a subtle point in probability that goes back to its very foundations with
Bayes and De Moivre trying to provide a justification of conditioning as a rule to compute
future beliefs through a sort of “temporal Dutch-book” argument – see the historical account
portrayed by Shafer (1982, 1985). In more recent times, this question appears to have been
explicitly recognised first by Hacking (1967, Sec. 3, p. 316). It has later been deeply studied
by a number of authors, in particular by Goldstein (1983) in statistics and Van Fraassen
(1984) in philosophy. Their standpoint has recently been taken up also in QM by Fuchs
and Schack (2012). Our standpoint is related but not quite the same; we refer the reader to
Zaffalon and Miranda (2013) for a detailed comparison of the different approaches.
In short, the question is that the evolution of beliefs in time is not part of the axioms of
probability: in particular, a coherent cone of gambles expresses Alice’s beliefs only at time
t0. So we need to impose some extra structure on the belief system if we want to formalise
the dynamics of Alice’s beliefs in time. Remember that the second axiom of QM explicitly
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refers to the state of the system after the measurement. By doing so it forces us to consider
what actually happens in the future. Therefore, if we want to be fully aligned with it in our
desirability approach to QM, we need also to talk about future beliefs: and in particular,
we have to require that future beliefs, after the measurement, i.e., the observation, equal
updated beliefs, as established at present time t0 through conditioning. This requirement is
called strong temporal coherence by Zaffalon and Miranda (2013, Sec. 6.4), since it indeed
represents a strong form of Dutch-book coherence through time: it means that Alice cannot
be made a partial loser even by combining assessments that she expresses at different points
in time (at the same point in time, coherence was already guaranteed by the desirability
axioms).
Strong temporal coherence is assumed throughout the paper. Yet, we will treat it in
a transparent way after completing the discussion of strong temporal coherence in Sec-
tion VI.A.
E. Interpretation of the second axiom as updating
We have shown that the second Axiom of QM can be recovered as the updating of Alice’s
belief model. It is formally and structurally equivalent to Bayes’ rule – the only
actual difference is the domain used, Cn×nh instead of Rn.
Under this interpretation, the “collapse of the wave function” is nothing else but the
outcome of updating Alice’s beliefs. Similarly to what happens in the experiment of the
classical coin, when she learns that the result is Head, her probability that the output of the
experiment is Head becomes one and so there is no more uncertainty. We have also shown
that subjects (Alice A, B and C) with different initial beliefs about the possible outcomes
of the experiment can possibly agree on their updated beliefs.
VI. THIRD AXIOM OF QM
In the previous sections, we have argued that a notion of coherence in time is needed
to fully identify probabilistic conditioning with measurement in QM. Temporal coherence
becomes even more fundamental when it comes to derive the temporal axiom of QM:
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Axiom III: the evolution of a closed quantum system is described by a unitary transforma-
tion. That is, the state ρ of the system at time t0 is related to the state ρ
′ of the system at
time t1 > t0 by a unitary operator U which depends only on the times t0 and t1, ρ
′ = UρU †.
A. Strong temporal coherence – part II
Let us consider the dynamics of Alice’s beliefs between present time t0 and future time
t1 under the assumption that she receives no information at all during such an interval of
time (i.e., we have a closed quantum system). Similarly to the discussion in Section V.D,
the focus is on characterising the coherence of Alice’s beliefs in this time.
To this end, we add the following rule to the betting framework of Section III.A:
5. At time t0, Alice declares which gambles G0 she accepts. Bookie can perform the
experiment at any time t1 ≥ t0. After having performed the experiment, Bookie
determines Alice’s payoff by “moving time-forward” Alice’s gambles (G0
φ
↪−→ G1), using
a map φ(·, t1, t0) from Cn×nh to itself that satisfies the following properties:
(i) φ(·, t0, t0) is the identity map;
(ii) φ(·, t1, t0) is onto;
(iii) φ(H+, t1, t0) = H+;
(iv) φ(·, t1, t0) is linear and constant preserving.
The rationale behind these conditions is the following.
Condition (i) is obvious: when t1 = t0, nothing changes with respect to what we have
discussed in the previous sections.
Condition (ii) is a way of stating that Alice’s beliefs are only established at present time
t0, since any gamble G1 at time t1 corresponds to an element G0 at time t0.
Condition (iii) means that if Alice is in a state of complete ignorance at time t0, she
remains in such a state at any later time: in other words, we are assuming that Alice does
not receive any further information from time t0 to time t1.
Finally, condition (iv) states once again that the utility scale is linear, that is, if Alice
finds G0, H0 desirable at time t0, then we know from Section III that she also finds G0 +H0
desirable. Because of linearity of φ(·, t1, t0), this implies that G1 + H1 = φ(G0 + H0, t1, t0),
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with G1 = φ(G0, t1, t0) and H1 = φ(H0, t1, t0), is desirable at time t1. Finally, φ(·, t1, t0) is
constant preserving.
Rule 5 leads to the following (the proof is in the Appendix, Theorem A.9):
Subjective formulation of the third axiom of QM
(1) All the transformations φ(·, t1, t0) defined above are of the following form
G
φ
↪−→ H = U †GU,
for some unitary or anti-unitary matrix U ∈ Cn×n, which only depends on the times t1, t0
and is equal to the identity for t1 = t0.
(2) The transformation φ(·, t1, t0) preserves coherence:
if K0 is SDG, then K1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | U †GU ∈ K0} is SDG too.
That is, in spite of the weakness of the conditions required for φ, we have obtained that:
◦ At any fixed time instant, Alice is rational. In fact, by point (2) above, at time t1 ≥ t0
Alice’s beliefs are modelled by an SDG.
◦ The payoff of gambles G0 and G1 = φ(G0, t1, t0) are the same, for any gamble G0.
That is, the gamble may change but the payoff is time-invariant (this is a consequence
of the fact that U is just a rotation matrix).
We can think of these two points as a slight weakening of the notion of strong temporal
coherence given by Zaffalon and Miranda (2013, Def. 25). That notion eventually requires
the cones to be equal at different time instants; here we just obtain the payoffs to be equal.
The rationale does not really change in the two cases: intuitively, here we allow the two
cones to be isomorphic to each other instead of just being equal. For this reason, with a
small abuse of terminology, we call rule 5 above strong temporal coherence too.
By exploiting duality, we can also reformulate the above results in terms of credal quan-
tum sets (see the Appendix, Proposition A.10). Indeed, let M0 be the credal quantum set
associated to K0. Because of the relationship K1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | U †GU ∈ K0} and the
duality between M0 and K0, it is possible to derive that:
K1 =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0
} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | (U †GU) · ρ > 0, ρ ∈M0} . (21)
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Notice that
(U †GU) · ρ = Tr(U †G†Uρ) = Tr(G†UρU †),
and moreover Tr(UρU †) = Tr(ρU †U) = Tr(ρ) = 1. Therefore
M1 =
{
UρU †
∣∣∣ρ ∈M0} . (22)
As time forward is implemented by a unitary operator, while an anti-unitary operator im-
plements time reversal, we have derived the third axiom of QM as a direct consequence of
strong temporal coherence.
Example 12. Classical coin. Let us go back to our coin example. First observe that any 2 × 2
unitary matrix can be written as
U =
 a b
−eiθb† eiθa†
 , (23)
with θ ∈ R, a, b ∈ C and |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. We have seen that in the classical case we are only
interested in diagonal gambles G0 = diag(g1, g2). Assume Alice finds G0 desirable at time t0, then
G1 = U
†G0U =
|a|2 g1 + |b|2 g2 a†b(g1 − g2)
ab†(g1 − g2) |b|2 g1 + |a|2 g2
 .
Since we are only interested in diagonal gambles G1 we must only consider transformations U that
transform diagonal matrices into diagonal matrices. This means that a†b = ab† = 0. This together
with the constraint |a|2 + |b|2 = 1 implies that, in the classical case, the only valid matrices are
(i) the identity map U1 = I and (ii) the permutation matrix
U2 =
0 1
1 0
 .
There are many other valid matrices, like U = [0,−1;−1, 0] for instance, but their actions on G
are either the identity map or a flipping U †2G0U2 = diag(g2, g1). Therefore, in the classical case,
the only aspect of the experiment that is allowed to change with time is the name of the events:
Ω = {Head, Tail} can become Ω = {Tail,Head}, but that is all. It is then clear that if Alice’s
set of strictly desirable gambles is coherent at time t0 then it is also coherent at time t1 (after the
permutation).
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FIG. 8: Alices’ sets of coherent strictly desirable gambles at time t0 (left) and at time t1
(right) after action U2.
A similar thing happens for the quantum coin. U is a rotation matrix and, therefore, its
only effect on Alice’s SDG is to rotate the cone in a way that H+ is always mapped into H+
and that the payoffs stay the same.
At this point it should be clear why there is a strong form of coherence in time in our
formulation: because, by “moving time forward” through φ, we can always think that Alice
assesses her beliefs at time t1 instead of t0; and hence, that she is implicitly dealing always
with the very same cone of desirable gambles. The same reasoning can be applied to the
question of updating discussed in Section V.D: if the measurement is done at time t1, we can
equivalently think of moving time forward up to t1 and then use (fixed-time) conditioning
to consequently update Alice’s beliefs.18
Overall, this means that Alice is always using the same global probabilistic model, her
SDG, irrespective of time. And that model cannot be made inconsistent by definition of
SDG. Once again, this is the very essence of the idea of strong coherence in time. For these
reasons, and to make things simpler, in the next sections we will assume that t1 = t0 so as
to avoid overcomplicating the treatment to explicitly account for time.
B. Interpretation of the third axiom as temporal coherence
In this section we have derived the third axiom of QM by strong temporal coherence
considerations. We have achieved this through a simple rule that describes how a gamble at
18 It is also possible to show that the same argument holds also in the case of multiple future time points,
possibly with measurements in between.
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time t1 corresponds to a gamble at time t0. This rule implies that the future is completely
determined by the past, that the utility scale is linear and that a state of complete ignorance
is mapped into a state of complete ignorance. Then we have shown as a consequence that
the relationship between Alice’s coherent set of desirable gambles at time t0 and Alice’s
coherent set of desirable gambles at time t1 must follow a unitary transformation – those
that preserve coherence in time.
VII. FOURTH AXIOM OF QM
Let us turn now to consider coherence for composite systems. In particular, we focus
on a composite system AB made by two subsystems denoted as A and B. Recall that QM
gambles are Hermitian matrices whose dimension depends on the number of outcomes of
the experiment; thus, if A has n outcomes and B has m outcomes, the composite systems
has nm outcomes and the corresponding gambles G are matrices in Cnm×nmh . We aim, as
usual, at empolying coherence-preserving operations to derive the fourth axiom of QM:
Axiom IV: the state space of a separable composite physical system is the tensor product of
the state spaces of the component physical systems. Moreover, if we have systems numbered
1 through `, and system number i is in the state ρi, then the joint state of the total system
is ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ`.
We will define two operations that are useful when dealing with composite systems:
marginalisation and extension. Moreover, we will define independence concepts. To make
things simpler, we will only consider the case ` = 2, but the next results hold for any `.
A. Marginalisation
Let us denote Alice’s SDG on the composite system AB as KAB. Given KAB, Alice may
wish to focus on one component only of the composite system AB, meaning that she neglects
one aspect of the experiment’s outcomes. For instance, she can focus on A – which means
ignoring B. Then the interesting gambles are those whose payoffs do not depend on the B
component, which are those that are constant with respect to B. It is easy to see that these
gambles are of the form G⊗ Im, with G ∈ Cn×nh and Im being the m×m identity matrix.
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Definition VII.1. Let KAB be an SDG in Cnm×nmh . The marginalisation of KAB w.r.t.
A is defined as:
margA(KAB) =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G⊗ Im ∈ KAB
}
. (24)
Analogously, the marginalisation of KAB w.r.t. B is defined as:
margB(KAB) =
{
G ∈ Cm×mh | In ⊗G ∈ KAB
}
,
where In is the n× n identity matrix.
It can be proven that if KAB is an SDG in Cnm×nmh , then both margA(KAB) and
margB(KAB) are SDGs (Appendix, first part of Proposition A.11): i.e., marginalisation
preserves coherence. Moreover, margA(KAB) and margB(KAB) are both maximal SDGs
whenever KAB is a maximal SDG (Appendix, second part of Proposition A.11).
In the case of a maximal SDG, Definition VII.1 provides a way to compute the marginal
density matrices ρA, ρB from ρAB (in particular from the dual KAB using (24)). The standard
way to obtain ρA from ρAB in QM is by using the partial trace operator (Nielsen and
Chuang, 2010, Sec. 2.4.3):
ρA = TrB(ρ
AB).
In QM, ρA is called a reduced density operator. By keeping our analogy between density
matrices and probabilities, we simply call it a marginal density matrix. It is interesting that
the motivations behind the use of the partial trace in QM is that it is the unique operation
that gives rise to the correct description of observable quantities for subsystems of a com-
posite system (Nielsen and Chuang, 2010, Box 2.6). Since our definition of marginalisation
is consistent with that of partial tracing – see in particular Nielsen and Chuang (2010, Box
2.6) –, the use of partial tracing has been justified from the perspective of our gambling sys-
tem: Alice wishes to focus on one of the components of the composite system AB, meaning
that she neglects one aspect of the experiment’s outcome.
From the fact that marginalisation preserves both coherence and maximality, we can also
derive that if the dual of a maximal SDG on AB, the density matrix ρAB, is equal to the
tensor product ρA ⊗ ρB (Appendix, Proposition A.12) then the marginal SDG computed
via (24), margA(KAB), has a dual that only includes the density matrix ρA – and similarly
for B. In QM, a density matrix ρAB such that ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB is called separable. In this
case too, by keeping our analogy between density matrices and probabilities, we simply say
46
that the density matrix ρAB factorises in the product of ρA and ρB. In probability, when a
joint probability on AB can be decomposed as the product of its marginals on A and B, we
talk about independence. We will show in Section VII.C that we can do the same in QM.
Example 13. Two classical coins. Let us consider two classical coins A and B. A gamble on the
composite system is in this case a Hermitian matrix on C4×4h . We know that in the classical case
we are only interested on diagonal gambles: G = diag(g) with g ∈ R4, that is g = (g1, g2, g3, g4),
where g1 is the payoff of the outcome (H,H) (Head on coin A and Head on coin B), and similarly
g2 for (H,T ), g3 for (T,H), g4 for (T, T ).
Alice finds the gambles f = (1,−1, 1,−1), h = (−1, 1,−1, 1), l = (1, 1,−1,−1), e =
(−1,−1, 1, 1) desirable but not strictly so (besides, as usual, the gambles G = diag(g)  0).
Hence her SDG KAB is:
KAB = {G = diag(g) ∈ C4×4h | g11 + g22 + g33 + g44 > 0}.
Let us see what we can conclude about her beliefs on the probability of the four outcomes of the
experiment. By applying (9), we derive that
MAB = {ρ ∈ D4×4h diagonal | G  0 or G · ρ > 0 ∀G ∈ KAB}.
Hence, by exploiting the fact that Tr(ρ) = 1, we can easily derive that G · ρ = Tr(G†ρ) =∑
i giiρii > 0 for any g ∈ K, which implies that ρ11 = ρ22 = ρ33 = ρ44 = 1/4. Therefore, Alice
believes that the four outcomes have all the same probability 1/4.
Let us now compute the marginal margA(KAB). By definition, we have that
margA(KAB) =
{
G ∈ C2×2h | G⊗ I2 ∈ KAB
}
.
Since we are focusing on diagonal gambles, i.e., G = diag(g1, g2), then G ⊗ Im = (g1, g1, g2, g2).
Therefore, we have that
margA(KAB) =
{
G = diag(g) ∈ C2×2h | (g1, g1, g2, g2) ∈ KAB
}
,
and (g1, g1, g2, g2) ∈ KAB if and only if g1 + g1 + g2 + g2 > 0 or, equivalently, g1 + g2 > 0. Hence:
margA(KAB) =
{
G = diag(g) ∈ C2×2h | g1 + g2 > 0
}
.
Its dual is clearly
MA = {ρ ∈ D2×2h diagonal | ρ = diag(1/2, 1/2)},
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meaning that Alice believes the coin A is fair too. The same holds for B. We have derived that
the marginal of the joint probability (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4) is (1/2, 1/2) both for A and B.
Example 14. Two quantum coins. We assume that Alice’s SDG on the composite system AB is
KAB = {G ∈ C4×4h | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ C4×4h | G ·D > 0}, with D =
1
2

1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1

.
By (10), we have thatMAB = {ρ = D}. Note that D is an entangled state. Alice’s marginal SDG
on the subsystem A is given by
margA(KAB) =
{
G ∈ C2×2h | G⊗ I2 ∈ KAB
}
, where G⊗ I2 =

g11 0 g12 0
0 g11 0 g12
g†12 0 g22 0
0 g†12 0 g22

,
where we have used the notation G = [g11, g12; g
†
12, g22] for the elements of G. G ⊗ I2 belongs to
KAB provided that G⊗I2 ·D > 0, but G⊗I2 ·D = Tr(G†⊗I2D) = g11 +g11 +g22 +g22. Therefore,
margA(KAB) =
{
G ∈ C2×2h | g11 + g22 > 0
}
and by (10):
MA =
ρ =
1/2 0
0 1/2
 .
So the marginal SDG on A is maximal. ρ = diag(1/2, 1/2) is the marginal of the entangled state
D. The same holds for B.
B. Coherent extension
Let us assume that Alice assesses her beliefs separately about the systems A and B and
study how she can coherently extend her beliefs to AB. This extension operation can be
regarded as the opposite of marginalisation discussed in Section VII.A.
Definition VII.2. Let KA and KB be two SDGs in Cn×nh and, respectively, Cm×mh . Their
natural extension to Cnm×nmh is the smallest, i.e., the least-committal, SDG on AB,
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denoted with extAB(KA,KB), such that:
margA(extAB(KA,KB)) = KA and margB(extAB(KA,KB)) = KB. (25)
The natural extension extAB(KA,KB) always exists (Appendix, Proposition A.13).
In case KA and KB are maximal SDGs with dual density matrices ρA and ρB, the natural
extension reduces to find all density matrices ρAB such that ρA = TrB(ρ
AB) and ρB =
TrA(ρ
AB). It is clear that ρAB may be not unique in general, as shown in the next example.
Example 15. Two quantum coins. Let us assume that KA = KB = {G ∈ C2×2h | g11 + g22 > 0},
which are the ones we have found in Example 15. The set extAB(KA,KB) is the smallest SDG
KAB such that margA(KAB) = KA and margB(KAB) = KB. In other words, we have to search for
the smallest SDG KAB such that:
G⊗ In ∈ KAB and In ⊗H ∈ KAB, (26)
for all G ∈ KA and H ∈ KB. Note that
G⊗ I2 =

g11 0 g12 0
0 g11 0 g12
g†12 0 g22 0
0 g†12 0 g22

, I2 ⊗H =

h11 h12 0 0
h†12 h22 0 0
0 0 h11 h12
0 0 h†12 h22

, (27)
with g11 + g22 > 0, h11 + h22 > 0. By duality (that G⊗ I2 ∈ KAB provided that G⊗ I2 · ρAB for
any ρAB ∈MAB) it is clear that the valid density matrices ρAB must satisfy:
G⊗ I2 · ρAB > 0 and I2 ⊗H · ρAB > 0.
For instance, all the following matrices satisfy the above constraints:
ρAB1 =
1
2

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

, ρAB2 =
1
2

1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1

,
ρAB3 =
1
2

1 0 0 ι
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
−ι 0 0 1

, ρAB4 =
1
2

1 0 0 1√
2
(1− ι)
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1√
2
(1 + ι) 0 0 1

,
and they are not the only ones.
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The natural extension has some resemblance with the operation of purification in QM.
Given a density matrix ρA of a quantum system, the goal is to find another subsystem
B and a pure state ρAB such that ρA = TrB(ρ
AB) (Nielsen and Chuang, 2010, Sec. 2.5).
However, in the case of the natural extension ρA and ρB are given and the goal is to find all
ρAB compatible with these marginals. Therefore, the natural extension is just the inverse of
marginalisation.
C. Irrelevance and independence
Let KAB be Alice’s SDG for the composite system AB. Let us assume that Alice receives
some information only related to the subsystem B. We address the case in which information
concerning the subsystem B does not change Alice’s beliefs about system A and/or vice
versa. To this end, we define the concepts of irrelevance and independence.
First of all, we consider the following result from linear algebra. Let us consider a pro-
jection measurement on B, ΠB = {ΠBi }mi=1, then In ⊗ ΠBi is a projection measurement
for the composite system AB. The proof of this result is immediate. First observe that
(In⊗ΠBi )† = In⊗ΠBi = (In⊗ΠBi )2 (idempotent), and (In⊗ΠBi )(In⊗ΠBj ) = In⊗(ΠBi ΠBj ) = 0
(orthogonal), and finally
∑
i In ⊗ ΠBi = In ⊗ Im = Inm (identity). However, it should be
observed that In ⊗ ΠBi has not rank 1.
We now define the concept of epistemic irrelevance.
Definition VII.3. An SDG KAB is said to satisfy epistemic irrelevance of A to B when
margA(KAB) = margA(KABB ) where
KABB =
{
H ∈ Cnm×nmh | H  0 or (In ⊗ ΠBi )H(In ⊗ ΠBi ) ∈ KAB
}
,
for each projector ΠBi and each projection measurement Π
B.
Let us briefly explain this definition. KABB is the SDG conditional on the event indicated
by In ⊗ ΠBi , as it follows from its definition and (16). Thus, margA(KAB) = margA(KABB )
means that Alice’s marginal SDG margA(KAB) on the subsystem A and the marginal on A
of Alice’s SDG updated with the information “the event indicated by ΠBi has happened”,
which is margA(KABB ), coincide. If this holds for all possible ΠBi then it means that any
information on B does not change Alice’s beliefs on A: KAB is said to satisfy epistemic
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irrelevance of A to B. By exchanging the roles of A and B, we define epistemic irrelevance
of B to A. From this we can get independence as a symmetrisation of irrelevance:
Definition VII.4. An SDG KAB is said to satisfy epistemic independence of A and B,
when it satisfies epistemic irrelevance both of A to B and of B to A.
If the density matrix of the composite system ρAB is the tensor product of the density
matrices ρA and ρB, then KAB satisfies epistemic independence of A and B (Appendix,
Proposition A.14). This result is similar to what we have in probability: if a joint prob-
ability pAB factorises as pAB = pApB, we say that the subsystems (variables) A and B
are independent. Actually also the inverse implication holds (Appendix, proposition A.15).
From these facts, we can finally derive the fourth axiom of QM:
Subjective formulation of the fourth axiom of QM
Given a maximal SDG KAB that satisfies epistemic independence of A and B, then its dual
density matrix ρAB is equal to
ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB,
where ρA is the dual density matrix of margA(KAB) and ρB is the dual density matrix of
margB(KAB) and vice versa. In other words, the last axiom of QM follows by epistemic
independence of A and B.
D. Separable natural extension
The aim of this section is to show that Bell’s inequality violation can easily be framed in
our theory of desirable gambles.
Before doing that, let us characterise a possible feature of the natural extension as defined
in Section VII:
Definition VII.5. Let KA and KB be two SDGs in Cn×nh and, respectively, Cm×mh . We say
that their natural extension extAB(K
A, KB) is separable if its dual only includes separable
density matrices, i.e.,
MAB =
{∑
i
wiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi
∣∣∣∑
i
wi = 1, wi ≥ 0, ρAi ∈ Dn×nh , ρBi ∈ Dm×mh
}
,
where the sum can be over a countable set of indices.
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Now, assume that KA and KB are maximal SDGs, so that they uniquely define ρA and
ρB. Assume that their natural extension is separable. Then the following inequalities hold
(Appendix, Theorem A.16) for each ρAB ∈MAB:
ρAB ≤ ρA ⊗ Im and ρAB ≤ In ⊗ ρB, (28)
and
ρAB ≥ ρA ⊗ Im + In ⊗ ρB − Inm and ρAB  0. (29)
The upper bound is know in QM as “reduction criterion” for density matrices; it was
first proven by Horodecki and Horodecki (1999) and independently formulated by Cerf et al.
(1999). Structurally the above inequalities are analogs of the Fre´chet bounds in probability
theory.
Fre´chet bounds: they are bounds for the probabilities of the conjunction of two events
given the probabilities of the individual events. If A,B are events, the Fre´chet inequalities
are
max(0, P (A) + P (B)− 1) ≤ P (A ∩B) ≤ min(P (A), P (B)).
If P (A) = 0.7 and P (B) = 0.6, then the probability of the conjunction, i.e., A∩B, is in the
interval
P (A ∩B) ∈ [max(0, P (A) + P (B)− 1),min(P (A), P (B))]
= [max(0, 0.7 + 0.6− 1),min(0.7, 0.6)] = [0.3, 0.6].
Entangled states violate the Fre´chet bounds for density matrices.
Consider for instance the entangled density matrix
ρAB =
1
2

1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
 ,
which has marginal ρA = ρB = diag(1/2, 1/2) as shown in Example 14. Entangled states
are not separable and it can easily be verified that
ρA ⊗ Im − ρAB  0 and In ⊗ ρB − ρAB  0,
since the resulting matrices have one negative eigenvalue.
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In other words, from the viewpoint of our desirability foundations of QM, the motivation
behind Bell’s inequality violation is that entangled states exhibit a form of “stochastic”
dependence stronger than the strongest classical dependence: and in fact they violate Fre´chet
bounds. Explaining Bell’s inequality violation through credal sets (imprecise probability)
was originally suggested by Hartmann and Suppes (2010). Here, we have shown that this is
in fact the case by working directly in Cn×nh .
E. Interpretation of the fourth axiom in terms of independence
In this section we have derived the fourth axiom of QM and shown that it preserves co-
herence. Moreover, by exploiting the semantics provided by the theory of desirable gambles,
we have been able to extend to QM probabilistic concepts such as:
◦ marginalisation;
◦ natural extension;
◦ epistemic irrelevance and independence.
By duality, we have shown that marginalisation corresponds to partial tracing for density
matrices. For maximal SDGs, the epistemic independence of A and B implies that ρAB =
ρA ⊗ ρB – as it happens in probability theory, independence means that the joint ρAB
factorises as the product of its marginals ρA, ρB. Moreover, by defining the concept of
separable natural extension, we have also shown that in QM it is possible to derive bounds
for the joint ρAB that are similar to Fre´chet bounds in probability theory and that entangled
states violate these bounds. This is all further evidence that QM is just a generalised theory
of probability.
VIII. SIMILARITY AND DIFFERENCE WITH QBISM
The foundation of quantum mechanics through desirability presented in this paper shares
a goal similar to that of QBism – a classical-Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics –,
which is to justify quantum mechanics by using coherence arguments (Appleby, 2005a,b;
Caves et al., 2002, 2007; Fuchs, 2002, 2003a,b; Fuchs and Schack, 2004, 2011, 2013; Mermin,
2014; Schack, 2003; Schack et al., 2001; Timpson, 2008).
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To this end, QBism aims at rewriting quantum mechanics in a way that does not involve
the density operator ρ (i.e., that is not defined on Cn×nh ) and use classical probabilistic
Bayesian arguments to prove coherence of quantum mechanics. For instance, Fuchs and
Schack (2011) have shown that it is possible to rewrite Born’s rule in a way that does not
include the density operator ρ anymore, so as to give it a classical-Bayesian interpretation.
For this purpose, they consider as measure a symmetric informationally complete (SIC)
POVM (Appleby, 2007; Renes et al., 2003), which allows Born’s rule to be rewritten as:
pj =
n2∑
i=1
(
(n+ 1)qi − 1
n
)
r(j|i). (30)
Here, qi represent the probability of the outcomes of an experiment (a SIC measure with
n2 outcomes), which is only imagined and never performed. The terms r(j|i) are instead
the probabilities of seeing the outcome j in the actually performed experiment, given the
outcome i in the imagined one. Finally, pj is the probability of the outcomes in the actual
experiment. Fuchs and Shack call (30) the “quantum law of total probability”, because they
interpret it as a modification of the standard law of total probability:
pj =
n2∑
i=1
r(j|i)qi, (31)
which is well known to follow from coherence, i.e., Dutch-book arguments (de Finetti, 1970;
Savage, 1954). Thus, according to Fuchs and Shack, the rule (30) can be regarded as an
addition to the standard Dutch-book coherence, a sort of “coherence plus”, which defines
the valid quantum states:
“It expresses a kind of empirically extended coherence – not implied by Dutch-
book coherence alone, but formally similar to the kind of relation one gets from
Dutch-book coherence” (Fuchs and Schack, 2011).
Under this view, Equation (30) can be interpreted as a consistency requirement, i.e., a law
that must hold to produce a consistent quantum world. Based on this idea, they suggest
that (30) should be taken as one of the basic axioms of quantum theory, since it provides
a particularly clear way of thinking of Born’s rule as an addition to Dutch-book coherence.
This axiom formulates as “everything in (30) that should be a probability – i.e., pj, qi, and
r(j|i) ) – actually is a probability”. Using this axiom, they show that it is possible to derive
some properties of quantum states directly in terms of probabilities.
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While we definitely find this interpretation interesting, we regard it as portraying a partial
view: in fact, the law (30) is not total probability, and hence, strictly speaking, is incoherent
according to de Finetti’s (classical) definition of coherence.
In contradistinction to QBism, we do not aim at demonstrating that the probabilities
derived from QM are Bayesian, but rather that the Bayesian theory itself is QM once it
is generalised to work in Cn×nh . This is achieved by bringing to light a duality relation
between sets of gambles defined on the complex space of hermitian matrices Cn×nh and
density matrices, in the same way as there is a duality relation between sets of real-valued
gambles and probabilities in the classical case. This also establishes in a definite sense that
QM is strongly self-consistent.
Finally notice that, while in QBism Alice’s beliefs are modelled by a single density matrix,
in our approach Alice can represent her beliefs by a closed convex set of density matrices: the
more Alice is ignorant about the experiment the bigger is her credal quantum set (dually,
the smaller is her cone of desirable gambles) and vice versa. For instance, the proposed
framework allows us to represent cases in which Alice does not have any knowledge about
the state of the quantum system. In these cases Alice should only accept gambles given by
PSDNZ matrices. The dual of her set of desirable gambles is therefore the set of all the
possible density matrices – she does not know ρ and, thus, all the ρ’s are possible candidates
to be the actual one for her.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have derived the four postulates of QM from a mathematical frame-
work made of rational gambling on a quantum experiment. Technically speaking, such a
framework is the dual of the Bayesian theory extended to the space of Hermitian matrices.
To say it with a slogan, we have obtained that QM is the Bayesian theory in the complex
numbers. Our results mean, in other words, that QM is a theory of probability – not just
that probabilities can be derived from QM.
This result has implications that we find worth considering. On the one hand, it means
that QM is a self-consistent theory, in a very strong sense: there is no way to draw incoherent
conclusions by using QM. On the other, it means that the common operations employed
with quantum mechanics can be regarded as rules of probability; and hence, that we can
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take advantage in a novel way of well-known probabilistic viewpoints to handle QM. We
have given a number of examples to show that this is in fact the case, where, for instance,
entanglement turns out to be a form of stochastic dependence, and Bell’s inequalities become
Fre´chet bounds. It also gives us a new tool, which is coherence, to orient ourselves in the
quantum world: we can in fact directly use the gambling framework to understand whether
or not some approaches or proposals are consistent with QM. For example, it can be shown
that dispersion free probability measures, used as counter-examples to Gleason’s theorem in
dimension two, are incoherent (see Benavoli et al. (2016)).
We should also at this point better clarify one peculiarity of the Bayesian theory we are
interpreting QM with. The coherent cones of gambles that represent Alice’s beliefs enable
us to deal with probability (that is, QM) in a very flexible way: in fact, they allow us to
smoothly deal with one or more than one density matrix at the same time. We have used
this feature, for example, every time we had to express the case of Alice being ignorant about
a quantum experiment. And it is just thanks to using sets of density matrices that some
aspects of the theory of quantum mechanics – like the violation of Bell’s inequalities – have
been easily explained. They have also allowed us to solve the “singularity” corresponding
to conditioning on an event of null probability and to define the natural extension of all
entangled states compatible with some marginals.
Sets of Bayesian probabilities are traditionally part of so-called Bayesian robustness,
and they are a very active field of research nowadays under the generic name of imprecise
probability. Therefore, to be fully clear, we should say that QM in our present formulation
is a theory of Bayesian robustness (see, e.g., Berger (1984, 1994)), one that deals with a set
of “probabilities” and that becomes truly Bayesian in the limit of a single matrix in the set.
However, the opportunities of using the flexible, set-based, formulation seem to be po-
tentially many and worth exploring. One of these could be checking whether there is room
in QM for cones of desirable gambles that are not strictly desirable and that for this reason
are far more expressive than those we have used in this paper.
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Appendix A: Propositions and proofs
1. Results in Section III
Proposition A.1. Let G ∈ Cn×nh . It holds that
G ≥ 0 iff CGC† ≥ 0 for any matrix C ∈ Cn×n.
Moreover, if G  0 and Π = {Π1, . . . ,Πn} is a projection measurement, then there is
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ΠjGΠj  0.
Proof. For the direct implication, it is enough to consider C = I. For the converse we reason
as follows. By hypothesis G ≥ 0, and therefore we can write G = LL† using Cholesky
factorisation. Then observe that
CGC† = CL(CL)†,
which is clearly PSD.
To prove the second part, we use the previous result to get
ΠiL(ΠiL)
† ≥ 0
and observe that it must be j such that ΠjGΠj  0, since Π is a basis.
2. Results in Section IV
Proposition A.2. The set K• is a closed convex cone.
Proof. K• is a cone since if R1, R2 ∈ K•, i.e., G ·R1 ≥ 0 and G ·R2 ≥ 0 for all G ∈ K, then
R1 +R2 ∈ K• because
G · (R1 +R2) = G ·R1 +G ·R2 ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ K,
and λR1 ∈ K for all λ > 0, since λG ·R1 ≥ 0. Closedness of K• follows by the continuity of
trace.
Proposition A.3. Let K be an SDG. The sets
M1 = {ρ ∈ Dn×nh | G · ρ ≥ 0 ∀G ∈ K}
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and
M2 = {ρ ∈ Dn×nh | G  0 or G · ρ > 0 ∀G ∈ K}
coincide.
Proof. First, notice that G · ρ ≥ 0 for every G  0 and every ρ ∈ Dn×nh . This means that
M2 ⊆ M1. For the other direction, we reason as follows. Let ρ ∈ M1. We have to verify
that G ·ρ > 0 for every G ∈ K\H+. Consider such a G ∈ K\H+ and assume that G ·ρ = 0.
Since K satisfies (S3), i.e. openness, there is ∆ > 0 such that G−∆ ∈ K. In particular ∆
can be chosen such that ∆ · ρ > 0, whence (G−∆) · ρ = −∆ · ρ < 0.
Theorem IV.4 [Representation theorem] It holds that
◦ (K•)◦ = K for every SDG K, and
◦ (M◦)• =M for every credal quantum set M.
Proof. For the first item, we reason as follows. By construction, (K•)◦ ⊇ K. It remains to
show that (K•)◦ −K = ∅. Assume that there is H ∈ (K•)◦ −K; since K is a convex set we
can use the Hahn-Banach theorem to separate {H} from K. If H is not in the closure of K,
then by the Hahn-Banach theorem there is a Hermitian operator σ such that Tr(H · σ) < 0
and Tr(G · σ) ≥ 0 for all G ∈ K. So there is σ ∈ K• such that Tr(H · σ) < 0 and so
H /∈ (K•)◦, a contradiction. Now assume that H /∈ K is in the border of the closure of
K, then since K is a non-pointed cone satisfying the openness property (S3) that includes
G  0, it means that H  0 is impossible. Then we can consider the convex open set
O ⊃ K that excludes H and apply the Hahn-Banach theorem so that there is a Hermitian
operator σ such that Tr(H · σ) ≤ 0 and Tr(G · σ) > 0 for all G ∈ O. Again this implies
that H /∈ (K•)◦, a contradiction.
To prove the second point ((M◦)• =M), we exploit the fact that M is a closed convex
cone and we use Hahn-Banach similarly to the previous point.
Proposition A.4. Let K be an SDG. If P (G) = P (G) for any G ∈ K, then its dual credal
set M includes a single density matrix.
Proof. Let us assume that this is not true and M includes ρa, ρb and ρa, ρb differ for
one element. If this element is the i-th element of the diagonal, then we can take G =
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diag(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where 1 is in the i-th row. Since G  0, it is included in K and
moreover
Tr(G†ρa) = ρaii 6= ρbii = Tr(G†ρb).
Assume now that the element is in the i-th row and in the j-th column, that is ρaij 6= ρbij and
because they are Hermitian matrices this also means that ρaji 6= ρbji. Then take the following
gamble G:
G = I + S, H = I + T,
where S is a matrix of zeros with Sij = Sji = 1 and T is a matrix of zeros with T
†
ij = Tji = ι.
The gambles G,H are PSDNZ. Indeed, for instance in the case of G, for any 0 6= u ∈ Cn
we have that u†Gu = u†u+ uiu
†
j + uju
†
i = (ui + uj)(ui + uj)
† +
∑
k 6=i,j ukku
†
kk  0. By (S2),
both gambles G and H are in K. Moreover
Tr(G†ρa) =
∑
i ρ
a
ii + ρ
a
ij + ρ
a
ji, T r(G
†ρb) =
∑
i ρ
a
ii + ρ
b
ij + ρ
b
ji,
T r(H†ρa) =
∑
i ρ
a
ii + ιρ
a
ij − ιρaji, T r(H†ρb) =
∑
i ρ
a
ii + ιρ
b
ij − ιρbji.
Write ρaij = a+ ιb and ρ
b
ij = c+ ιd, we have that
ρaij + ρ
a
ji = a+ ιb+ a− ιb = a, ρbij + ρbji = c+ ιd+ c− ιd = c,
ιρaij − ιρaji = ιa+ b− ιa+ b = b, ιρbij − ιρbji = d,
and one of them must be different.
Proposition A.5. Let M = Dn×nh , then we have that
P (G) = inf
ρ∈Dn×nh
Tr(G†ρ) = λmin(G), P (G) = sup
ρ∈Dn×nh
Tr(G†ρ) = λmax(G),
where λmin(G) (resp. λmax(G)) is the minimum (resp. maximum) eigenvalue of G.
Proof. Let us assume that
ρ =
k∑
i=1
λiuiu
†
i .
Let G =
∑n
j=1 δjvjv
†
j , now if we decompose vj =
∑n
i=1 c
(j)
i ui (w.r.t. the basis {ui}), we can
rewrite G as
G =
n∑
j=1
δjvjv
†
j =
n∑
j=1
δj(
n∑
i=1
c
(j)
i ui)(
n∑
k=1
c
(j)
k uk)
†
=
n∑
j=1
δj
(
n∑
i=1
c
(j)
i (c
(j)
i )
†uiu
†
i +
n∑
i 6=k,i,k=1
c
(j)
i (c
(j)
k )
†uiu
†
k
)
.
(A1)
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We exploit the fact that
Tr(G†ρ) =
k∑
i=1
λiTr(G
†uiu
†
i ) =
k∑
i=1
λiTr(uiu
†
iG
†uiu
†
i ).
Hence, observe that
Gulu
†
l =
n∑
j=1
δj
(
c
(j)
l (c
(j)
l )
†ulu
†
l +
n∑
l 6=i=1
c
(j)
i (c
(j)
l )
†uiu
†
l
)
=
(
n∑
j=1
δjc
(j)
l (c
(j)
l )
†
)
ulu
†
l +
n∑
l 6=i=1
(
n∑
j=1
δjc
(j)
i (c
(j)
l )
†
)
uiu
†
l
and so
ulu
†
lGulu
†
l =
(
n∑
j=1
δjc
(j)
l (c
(j)
l )
†
)
ulu
†
l = δˆlulu
†
l , (A2)
where δˆl =
n∑
j=1
δjc
(j)
l (c
(j)
l )
†. Therefore
k∑
i=1
λiTr(uiu
†
iG
†uiu
†
i ) =
k∑
i=1
λiδˆi.
Now since
∑k
i=1 λi = 1, the minimum is obtained by choosing λk = 1 where k = arg mini δˆi,
whence
k∑
i=1
λiTr(uiu
†
iG
†uiu
†
i ) =
n∑
j=1
δjc
(j)
k (c
(j)
k )
†.
Since c
(j)
k (c
(j)
k )
† ≤ 1 (this follows from the fact that 1 = v†jvj =
∑n
i=1 c
(j)
i (c
(j)
i )
† for each j)
and
n∑
j=1
c
(j)
k (c
(j)
k )
† ≤ 1, the minimum value is obtained by putting all the mass on the index
j corresponding to arg mini δi and zero otherwise.
3. Results in Section V
Proposition A.6. Let K be an SDG. Then the set of desirable gambles conditional on Πi
KΠi =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0 or ΠiGΠi ∈ K
}
is also an SDG.
Proof. By definition H+ ⊆ KΠi , thus KΠi satisfies (S2). The fact that KΠi is a non-pointed
convex cone (S1) can be shown as follows. Firstly
ΠiG1Πi,ΠiG2Πi ∈ K ⇒ ΠiG1Πi + ΠiG2Πi = Πi(G1 +G2)Πi ∈ K
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and so G1 +G2 ∈ KΠi . Similarly
ΠiGΠi ∈ K ⇒ λΠiGΠi = Πi(λG)Πi ∈ K.
Finally Πi0Πi = 0 /∈ K, meaning that KΠi is non-pointed.
We finally verify that KΠi satisfies openness (S3). Let G ∈ KΠi \ H+. It holds that
ΠiGΠi ∈ K. We have two cases to consider, depending on whether ΠiGΠi  0 or not.
Assume first ΠiGΠi  0, and consider Πj, j 6= i. By definition Πj  0. Moreover ΠiΠjΠi =
0. Then ΠiGΠi − ΠiΠjΠi = Πi(G − Πj)Πi  0. This means that Πi(G − Πj)Πi ∈ K and
therefore (G − Πj) ∈ KΠi , with Πj  0. We now check the case that ΠiGΠi /∈ H+. Since
K =M◦, it holds that, for α > 0,
Πi(G− αΠi)Πi ∈ K ⇔ ΠiGΠ− αΠi ∈ K
⇔ Tr((ΠiG†Πi)ρ)− αTr(ΠiΠiΠiρ) > 0 for every ρ ∈M
⇔ Tr((ΠiG†Πi)ρ)− αTr(ΠiρΠi) > 0 for every ρ ∈M.
Consider ∆ > 0. This implies that ∆ =
∑
j αjΠj, with αj > 0. Assume ΠiGΠi−∆ ∈ K.
We have that ΠiGΠi−
∑
j αjΠj ∈ K and then Tr((ΠiG†Πi)ρ)−
∑
j αjTr(ΠiΠjΠiρ) > 0 for
every ρ ∈M. But this implies that Tr((ΠiG†Πi)ρ)−αiTr(ΠiρΠi) > 0 for every ρ ∈M. By
the representation theorem, we conclude that for αiΠi  0, Πi(G − αΠi)Πi ∈ K and thus
G− αΠi ∈ KΠi .
The next results is an immediate consequence of Proposition A.6. Remember that con-
ditioning for non-elementary events is defined as
KΠJ =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh
∣∣∣∣∣G  0 or ∑
j∈J
ΠjGΠj ∈ K
}
,
for some subset J of the indexes {1, . . . , n}.
Corollary A.7. KΠJ is SDG.
4. Results in Section VI
For the sake of notation, by h we denote the map φ(·, t1, t0) introduced in Section VI.
Definition A.8. A temporal coherent transformation is any map from H onto itself such
that
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C1: h(cI) = cI for every c ∈ N,
C2: h(H+) = H+,
C3: h(αG1 + βG2) = αh(G1) + βh(G2) for every G1, G2 ∈ Cn×nh and every α, β > 0.
Theorem A.9. Let h be a temporal coherent transformation. Then there is a unitary or
anti-unitary U ∈ Cn×n such that
h(G) = U †GU
for every G ∈ Cn×nh , which is unique up to a phase. Moreover if K is an SDG, then
K′ = {G ∈ Cn×nh | U †GU ∈ K} is an SDG too.
Proof. First notice that from (C3) in Definition A.8 we get that h is linear, i.e., for every
G1, G2 ∈ Cn×nh , and every α, β ∈ R,
h(αG1 + βG2) = αh(G1) + βh(G2).
From Schneider (1965, Theorem 2), there exists a non-singular matrix U ∈ Cn×n such that
either h(G) = U †GU for every G ∈ Cn×nh , or h(G) = U †G′U for every G ∈ Cn×nh . By
condition (C1) in Definition A.8, U †U = I, meaning that U is unitary or anti-unitary.
Moreover, notice that, up to a phase, the two operations (h(G) = U †GU or h(G) = U †G′U)
are the same.
We finally verify that K′ is an SDG. It is immediate to verify that it satisfies properties
(S1), (S2) in Definition III.1. For property (S3) – openness –, we reason as follows. Assume
G ∈ K′. This means that U †GU ∈ K. Since K is an SDG, it satisfies openness: U †GU  0
or U †GU − ∆ ∈ K for some 0 < ∆ ∈ Cn×nh . In the first case, notice that in this case too
there is 0 < ∆ ∈ Cn×nh such that from U †GU −∆ ∈ K. From (C2) in Definition A.8, we can
pick ∆′ > 0 such that h(∆′) = ∆. Thus (G−∆′) ∈ K′, since h(G−∆′) = h(G)− h(∆′) =
h(G)−∆ ∈ K.
Proposition A.10. Consider a temporal coherent transformation h represented by the uni-
tary matrix U . Let K0 be an SDG, K1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | U †GU ∈ K0} and (K0)• = M0.
Then
(K1)• =M1 =
{
UρU †
∣∣∣ρ ∈M0} .
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Proof. First of all, notice that since the transformation is represented by the unitary matrix
U , it preserves the eigenvalues, meaning that
G  0⇔ U †GU  0. (A3)
Let M0 be the credal quantum set associated to K0. If we verify that:
K1 =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0
} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | (U †GU) · ρ > 0, ∀ρ ∈M0} , (A4)
we are done. Indeed, note that
(U †GU) · ρ = Tr(U †G†Uρ) = Tr(G†UρU †),
and observe that Tr(UρU †) = Tr(ρU †U) = Tr(ρ) = 1 and, thus, we can derive that
M1 =
{
UρU †
∣∣∣ρ ∈M0} .
We exploit the relationship K1 = {G ∈ Cn×nh | U †GU ∈ K0} and the duality between M0
and K0 to derive Equation (A4):
G ∈ K1 ⇔ U †GU ∈ K0 (definition of K1)
⇔ U †GU  0 ∨ (U †GU) · ρ > 0, ∀ρ ∈M0 (definition of (·)◦)
⇔ G  0 ∨ (U †GU) · ρ > 0, ∀ρ ∈M0 (Equation (A3)).
5. Results in Section VII
Proposition A.11. Let KAB be an SDG in Cnm×nmh . Then:
1. Both margA(KAB) and margB(KAB) are SDGs.
2. Moreover, they are both maximal SDGs whenever KAB is a maximal SDG too.
Proof. We just check the case of margA(KAB), the remaining one is analogous.
Given two matrices N,M , the eigenvalues of N ⊗ M are equal to the product of the
eigenvalues of N and M . Hence, if G  0 then G ⊗ Im  0 and, thus, G ⊗ Im ∈ KAB,
since KAB is an SDG (it accepts partial gain). Since (G1 +G2)⊗ Im = G1 ⊗ Im +G2 ⊗ Im
and (λG) ⊗ Im = λ(G ⊗ Im), it follows that margA(KAB) is a cone. It is also non-pointed
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since 0 ⊗ Im = 0 and 0 /∈ KAB. Moreover, for any G ∈ margA(KAB) either G  0 or
G − ∆ ∈ margA(KAB) for some ∆ > 0 (openness). To prove the last property, consider a
G that is not PSDNZ but G ⊗ Im ∈ KAB. If such a G does not exist then the openness
property holds. If it exists, then consider (G−∆)⊗Im = G⊗Im−∆⊗Im with ∆ > 0. Take
the dual of KAB, MAB; then, since G ⊗ Im is not PSDNZ, the constraint G ⊗ Im ∈ KAB
means that
G⊗ Im · ρ > 0 ∀ρ ∈MAB.
Let ε = minρ∈MAB G⊗ Im · ρ, then take ∆ = αεIn > 0 with 0 < α < 1, it follows that
G⊗ Im · ρ−∆⊗ Im · ρ > 0 ∀ 0 < α < 1,
which proves that margA(KAB) is open.
We verify that margA(KAB) is maximal whenever KAB is maximal. Since by hypothesis
KAB is maximal, its dualMAB includes only a single density matrix ρˆAB. Let H = F−εIn ∈
Cn×nh a gamble such that Tr(F †⊗ ImρˆAB) ≤ 0 and so Tr(F †⊗ ImρˆAB)− εTr(In⊗ ImρˆAB) =
Tr(F † ⊗ ImρˆAB) − ε < 0 for any ε > 0. Then consider the gamble G = −H. G is in
margA(KAB) because Tr(G†⊗ ImρˆAB) = −Tr(H†⊗ ImρˆAB) > 0 and so (F −εI)⊗ Im ∈ KAB
for any ε > 0. Since H−H = 0, margA(KAB) cannot include any further gamble while being
an SDG (for any ε > 0, openness).
Proposition A.12. Let KAB be a maximal SDG. Assume that
MAB = {ρAB ∈ Dnm×nmh : ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB},
with ρA ∈ Dn×nh and ρB ∈ Dm×mh . Then we have that
margA(KAB) = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | G · ρA > 0},
so that MA = {ρA}. A similar result holds for B.
Proof. Let us start from MAB, its dual is defined via (10) as
KAB = {H ∈ Cnm×nmh | H  0} ∪ {H ∈ Cnm×nmh | H · ρA ⊗ ρB > 0}.
By applying the definition of marginal SDG, we have that
margA(KAB) =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G⊗ Im ∈ KAB
}
.
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Since G  0 implies G ⊗ Im  0, it follows that G ⊗ Im ∈ KAB (it includes all PSDNZ
matrices). If it is not the case, then H = G⊗ Im is in KAB provided that
0 < G⊗ Im · ρA ⊗ ρB = Tr((G† ⊗ Im)(ρA ⊗ ρB)) = Tr((G†ρA)⊗ (Im ⊗ ρB)) = Tr(G†ρA),
which proves the theorem.
Proposition A.13. The natural extension extAB(KA,KB) always exists.
Proof. The natural extension is defined as
extAB(KA,KB) = posi
(H+ ∪ {G⊗ Im | G ∈ KA} ∪ {In ⊗H | H ∈ KB}) ,
where H+ is the the set of PSDNZ matrices in Cnm×nm and posi denotes the conic closure:
posi(S) =
{
k∑
i=1
αiHi
∣∣∣ Hi ∈ S, αi ∈ R, αi > 0, i, k = 1, 2, . . .} .
Therefore extAB(KA,KB) is a convex cone that includes all PSDNZ matrices; it remains
to show that it is non-pointed or, equivalently, that it does not include any negative semi-
definite matrix (NSD).
First observe that G,H cannot be NSD matrices because KA and KB are SDG. It follows
that G⊗ Im and In ⊗H are not NSD either. Moreover,
αG⊗ Im + βIn ⊗H
= α(VG ⊗ VH)(ΛG ⊗ Im)(VG ⊗ VH)† + β(VG ⊗ VH)(In ⊗ ΛH)(VG ⊗ VH)†
= α(VG ⊗ VH)(αΛG ⊗ Im + βIn ⊗ ΛH)(VG ⊗ VH)†,
with α, β > 0 and where G = VGΛGV
†
G, H = VHΛHV
†
H Im = VHV
†
H and In = VGV
†
G. Note
that max diagonal(αΛG ⊗ Im + βIn ⊗ ΛH) > 0 because the vector includes all the sums of
the eigenvalues of G and H, i.e., λG + λH . Thus, there is at least one positive sum.
Proposition A.14. Let KAB be a maximal SDG. Assume that
MAB = {ρAB ∈ Dnm×nmh : ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB},
with ρA ∈ Dn×nh , and ρB ∈ Dm×mh and that Tr(ΠBi ρBΠBi ) > 0 for any ΠBi and ΠB. Then
KAB satisfies epistemic independence of A and B.
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Proof. From duality, we derive that
KAB = {H ∈ Cnm×nmh | H  0} ∪ {H ∈ Cnm×nmh | H · (ρA ⊗ ρB) > 0}.
Consider the first set of gambles and observe that for any 0  G ∈ Cn×nh , H = G⊗ Im  0
and so G is in margA(KAB). Now consider the second set of gambles. For H = G⊗ Im, we
have:
(G⊗ Im) · (ρA ⊗ ρB) = Tr
(
(G†ρA)⊗ ρB
)
= Tr(G†ρA)Tr(ρB).
Since Tr(ρB) > 0, we finally have that
margA(KAB) = {G ∈ Cn×nh | G  0} ∪ {G ∈ Cn×nh | G · ρA > 0}.
Now consider
KABB = {H ∈ Cnm×nmh | H  0 or (In ⊗ ΠBi )H(In ⊗ ΠBi ) ∈ KAB},
which by the definition of KAB is
{H ∈ Cnm×nmh | H  0 or
(
(In ⊗ ΠBi )H(In ⊗ ΠBi )
) · (ρA ⊗ ρB) > 0}.
For the second inequality observe that(
(In ⊗ ΠBi )H(In ⊗ ΠBi )
) · (ρA ⊗ ρB)
= Tr
(
H†(In ⊗ ΠBi )(ρA ⊗ ρB)(In ⊗ ΠBi )
)
and
(In ⊗ ΠBi )(ρA ⊗ ρB)(In ⊗ ΠBi ) = (ρA ⊗ ΠBi ρB)(In ⊗ ΠBi ) = ρA ⊗ ΠBi ρBΠBi
and, thus,
KABB = {H ∈ Cnm×nmh | H  0 or H · (ρA ⊗ ΠBi ρBΠBi ) > 0}.
For H = G⊗ Im, we know that if G  0 then H = G⊗ Im  0. For the inequality, we have
G⊗ Im · (ρA ⊗ ΠBi ρBΠBi ) = Tr(G†ρA)Tr(ΠBi ρBΠBi ).
Since Tr(ΠBi ρBΠ
B
i ) > 0 by hypothesis, we obtain that
margA(KABB ) =
{
G ∈ Cn×nh | G⊗ Im ∈ KABB
}
.
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Proposition A.15. Let KAB be an SDG satisfying independence of A and B and let
margA(KAB) and margB(KAB) be maximal SDGs with associated credal quantum sets
MmargA(KAB) = {ρA} and MmargB(KAB) = {ρB} such that Tr(ΠAi ρAΠAi ) > 0 for any ΠAi
and ΠA and Tr(ΠBi ρBΠ
B
i ) > 0 for any Π
B
i and Π
B. Then
MAB = {ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB},
i.e., KAB is maximal with dual density matrix ρA ⊗ ρB.
Proof. The proof is quite tedious and, thus, we will mostly give just the intuition behind
it. Let assume there is ρAB 6= ρA ⊗ ρB. Since the marginal margA(KAB) of the composite
system has density matrix ρA, we know that
Tr(G†ρA) = Tr(G† ⊗ ImρAB) ∀G ∈ margA(KAB),
which implies that
ρA = TrB(ρ
AB),
where TrB denotes the partial trace. Similarly, because of epistemic independence we know
that
ρA = TrB((In ⊗ ΠBi )ρAB(In ⊗ ΠBi ))/Tr((In ⊗ ΠBi )ρAB(In ⊗ ΠBi ))
for any ΠBi . Similarly for the subsystem B. This defines the system of equations
ρA = TrB(ρ
AB)
ρA = TrB((In ⊗ ΠBi )ρAB(In ⊗ ΠBi ))/Tr((In ⊗ ΠBi )ρAB(In ⊗ ΠBi )) ∀ΠBi
ρB = TrA(ρ
AB)
ρB = TrA((Π
A
j ⊗ Im)ρAB(ΠAj ⊗ Im))/Tr((ΠAj ⊗ Im)ρAB(ΠAj ⊗ Im)) ∀ΠAj
Tr(ρAB) = Tr(ρA) = Tr(ρB) = 1
and given the arbitrariness of ΠBi and Π
B
j , this allows us to always find a worst case and so
to show that ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB.
Theorem A.16. Assume that KA and KB are maximal SDGs and so they uniquely define ρA
and ρB and assume that their natural extension is separable. Then the following inequalities
hold:
ρAB ≤ ρA ⊗ Im and ρAB ≤ In ⊗ ρB (A5)
and
ρAB ≥ ρA ⊗ Im + In ⊗ ρB − Inm and ρAB  0. (A6)
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Proof. Note that, since
TrB(
∑
i
wiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi ) =
∑
i
wiTrB(ρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi ) =
∑
i
wiρ
A
i Tr(ρ
B
i ) =
∑
i
wiρ
A
i ,
it follows that
∑
iwiρ
A
i = ρ
A and, similarly,
∑
iwiρ
B
i = ρ
B. Since ρBi ≤ Im (it can easily be
verified using the eigenvalue decomposition) we have that
ρAB =
∑
i
wiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi ≤
∑
i
wiρ
A
i ⊗ Im = ρA ⊗ Im.
The inequality can be proven by using the eigenvalue decomposition of ρAi and ρ
B
i and
ρAi ⊗ ρBi = (V Ai ⊗ V Bi )(ΛAi ⊗ ΛBi )(V Ai ⊗ V Bi )†;
note that (V Ai ⊗ V Bi )(V Ai ⊗ V Bi )† = Inm and so ΛAi ⊗ ΛBi are the eigenvalues of ρAi ⊗ ρBi .
Now, since
ΛAi ⊗ ΛBi ≤ ΛAi ⊗ Im,
the inequality follows. The proof for B is analogous. For the second part, we use the first
part to derive that
Inm ≥ ρA ⊗ Im + In ⊗ ρB −
∑
i
wiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi ≥ 0.
In fact, since In ⊗ ρB −
∑
iwiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi ≥ 0, we can assume that
In ⊗ ρB −
∑
i
wiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi = 0,
whence it follows that Inm ≥ ρA ⊗ Im, which is obviously true. Similarly for ρA ⊗ Im −∑
iwiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi = 0. Then we have that∑
i
wiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi ≥ ρA ⊗ Im + In ⊗ ρB − Inm.
Finally, ρAB is by definition greater than zero.
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